

# ***Compulsory Development: An Ideal Type of Land Acquisition in India and China, 1980–2014***

**Yinghong Huang**

Jindal Global Law School, Jindal Global University, India  
hyh205@163.com

*In this article, land acquisition (LA) in India and China since the 1980s has been theorised as an ‘ideal’ model, namely, compulsory development, which highlights the extremely active role of the state and the compulsory measures it takes for LA in both countries in order to achieve its development goals. In both countries, the state acts as the land use planner, regulation maker in the land administration, as well as a major land developer and most influential player in the land market. At the same time, it extracts a high proportion of the benefits from land development projects, which is realised through compulsory LA despite the numerous flaws in the LA institutions. Compulsory development, as we term it, is a key feature in the political economy of LA in both countries. It provides an ideal model to understand and compare the phenomenon of LA in these two largest developing societies and to develop a systematic analysis of LA, and more broadly, of development in both countries. As the initial product in a larger research project, in this article we focus mainly on the theoretical model of this compulsory development, including its definition, characteristics and variations.*

**Keywords:** Land acquisition, compulsory development, ideal type, land market

## **INTRODUCTION**

Since the 1980s, both China and India have witnessed large-scale land acquisition (LA).<sup>1</sup> This has been accompanied by furious protests and criticisms of its misuse,

<sup>1</sup> The period examined in this article begins in the 1980s, just after China began implementing its reform and opening-up policy. India's reform of the earlier Nehruvian policies was also initiated in the 1980s (Kohli 2006). However, the dramatic reforms launched in 1991 are regarded as the turning point in the continuing transition in India's political economy. In addition, in both countries, LA has been used for several and vast divergent purposes, such as national security, defense, national development projects,

the impoverishment it causes and the brutality of the governments' actions. Some scholars have argued (Ren 2017) that the differences in the political regimes in both countries are insufficient to explain the politics of LA and the rural resistance in the two countries. A democratic and multiparty system in India has not prevented violent LA from happening, and large-scale protests against LA have occurred and been discussed in the public media in the one-party communist-ruled state of China. The differences in the systems of land ownership—largely private ownership in India and public ownership in China, including the Chinese state-owned system in urban regions and collective ownership in rural regions—do not materially alter the character of the land disputes between the state and dispossessed landowners or landholders.

In the studies of LA in China, several scholars hold that the absence of private ownership and authoritarianism there lead to LA problems (Mao 2009; Zhang 2007). Yet, in the case of India, we find the same kind of adverse reactions as in China. These observations imply that there are some other variables which contribute to the similarities in the LA process in India and China. For this reason, a comprehensive and in-depth comparative study is necessary to better understand LA in India and China. Such a study will enlarge our knowledge of LA and its consequences in both countries and provide a useful foundation for deriving lessons from each country's experience.

Among the numerous papers on LA in both countries, only a few have compared the two systems. For instance, Ren (2017) examines how the different kinds of involvement of the subnational state in land speculation have led to differences in the spatial dynamics of protest. Subhash C. Ray (2015) compares LA for private development in the United States, India and China to identify differences in the challenges involved. He concludes that because LA for private development is inevitable in emerging economies, the government should ensure full compensation and proper rehabilitation to the farmers who are displaced and deprived of their livelihoods. Other than these papers, academic articles are difficult to find, even though several scholars from different prominent research institutes have made efforts to compare the situation across the two countries.<sup>2</sup>

This article explores the phenomenon of LA in India and China. It should be seen as the beginning of a series to highlight different aspects of LA in India and China with the goal of constructing a systematic analysis of the development impact of LA in both countries. A general hypothesis has been advanced that the LA issue since 1980s in both countries is a convergent manifestation of the development approach adopted by the states involved and the counter response from their societies, particularly the affected peasants. The successes and failures, the advances and setbacks during the LA

and so on. In this article, we focus essentially on the profitable LA projects, particularly for industrial, infrastructural, urban purposes, which have generated great land value surplus and arisen in accelerative speed since 1980s in both countries.

<sup>2</sup> Scholars such as Manjusha S. Nair from George Mason University and Lynette Ong from Toronto University have shown their interest in this theme. In addition, on 2 May 2018, a workshop on 'Land Use in Asia', was held at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, where seven out of the total of nine papers discussed LA in India and China.

process can be better understood and analysed through the perspective of the politics of development.

The following analysis focuses on the specific impetus of the state to engage in LA in both countries. It has been developed into the notion of compulsory development, which serves as a starting point and an ‘ideal type’ for further studies.<sup>3</sup>

It is argued that the controversial LA in both countries during the same period is a dynamic and complicated consequence of their approach to development, namely compulsory development. It is initiated and implemented by the state and comprises three key elements, namely, institutional exclusion for land development, revenue extraction in land development and intensive compulsion for LA. These three basic elements and their variations will be examined separately in the subsequent sections, followed by a broader discussion at the end of the article.

### **INSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSION IN THE LAND MARKET**

A frequent justification for LA lies in the difficulties or impossibility of direct purchase of land for development. In India, for example, to acquire a certain amount of land for one project, the enterprise may have to hold discussions with thousands of households to acquire their fragmented land holdings. On the other hand in China, the direct purchase of agricultural land for non-agricultural use is supposed to be illegal according to the relevant land law, the Land Administration Law (LAL) revised in 1998. This is despite the fact that in some subtle and roundabout ways, the practice has not been completely ruled out and a black market in land consequently emerges. In the interest of reducing the transition costs, protecting the environment, guaranteeing food security, etc., the necessity of compulsory LA to support a development project—for a private company, state-owned enterprise or a public-private partnership (PPP)—has been rationalised. The land markets in both countries tend to exclude the direct purchase of a large amount of land which would result in changes to its original use. In short, LA seems to be unavoidable.

Ironically, despite the different land systems and polities, both countries significantly exclude the landowners or the landholders from participating in the process of industrialisation and urbanisation by providing their land as a commodity. First, the land market in both countries is divided into two independent sections through strict regulations. Both countries have rigid regulations limiting the transference of agricultural land into industrial or other urban uses. More obviously, in China, a revision of the LAL of 1986 (revised in 1998) states that all land for urban purposes

<sup>3</sup>The notion of ‘ideal type’, as we will explain more precisely later (see ‘Compulsory Development as an Ideal Type and Its Variations’ in this article), is borrowed from Max Weber as a ‘mental construct’ to grasp the essential characteristics and tendency of individual phenomena. It never implies that the conceptual model developed in this paper is the perfect or best LA model in both countries.

(such as for industrial, commercial and residential projects) with a few exceptions,<sup>4</sup> has to be acquired by the state (mostly by the local government) and converted to state-owned land first (LAL, Clause 43 and 44). Only after this land ownership change and LA process, can land users develop the land for urban purposes. Without these procedures, the village collective cannot convert the land use by themselves or transfer land to land developers. In India, private applications for land-use change have to go through a series of complicated and time-consuming processes, even for the holder's own uses. Generally, agricultural land cannot be procured for commercial purposes without a non-agricultural clearance permit, which is beyond the capabilities of enterprises without the support from the government (Balakrishnan 2013: 51; Seshadri 2011: 84).

Second, the subnational state in both countries plays a dominant role in the urban land market. The present Chinese Constitution mandates that urban land is state-owned property under the administration of the concerned subnational government. It creates a form of property right or land use right for different uses with various durations, for example, 70 years for real estate, 40 years for commerce and 30 years for industrial use. These use rights are held by individual companies or persons. This establishes an urban land market where the state is the sole and primary seller. In this regard, the banning of free purchase of agricultural land for non-agricultural use, even if in accordance with the urban planning, safeguards and preserves the monopoly of the state in the urban primary land market. This is true despite China's strong and active secondary land market which involves land transfers between private companies or individuals that have received land use rights from the state.

The story is different in India. India's subnational states do not have the monopolistic powers enjoyed by their Chinese counterparts; however, they also impose strict controls on the urban land market. For example, The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act (ULCRA), a national law enacted in 1976, along with subnational laws in 17 states and union territories, impose strict ceilings on the holding of vacant land of urban citizens. The surplus land has to be acquired by government, and anyone who conceals their extra holdings can be punished (ULCRA, Clause 18). Even though the Act was repealed by the Centre in 1998, the state's strong control in the urban land market persists particularly in some states, for example, Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal, etc. (Bakore 2007; Seshadri 2011: 81). As a unique case of Delhi, as it is a union territory, the government has the only access to land in accordance with the city's master plan and several regulating acts such as the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) 1894 and Delhi Development Act 1957 (Sivam 2002).

From the preceding account it is clear that there exists an asymmetrical reform of the land market in China. Neo-liberalising reform has not been evenly applied. Although

<sup>4</sup> Under the LAL, and with lawful approval, village collectives may use their collective-owned land to build township or town enterprises, houses for villagers, or public utilities and welfare undertakings.

some regulations that carried over from the days of central planning have been removed in a timely fashion in order to boost economic growth, other sections stand untouched or have been enhanced. For instance, as early as 1987, the urban land market was legally created as a system of land use rights and land leasing system that allowed the local government to 'sell' land to an individual or a company. Nonetheless, the 1998 revision excludes a village commune which owns land collectively from the urban land market. As for India, the access to land has been a requirement for developers to initiate any special economic zone (SEZ) project according to the Special Economic Zone Act, 2005 (Article 3[8]). However, given the government's strict control of land transactions, most of the investors could not acquire adequate land by direct purchase; they had to either rely on the assistance of the government or form a joint venture with the respective governments (Seshadri 2011: 88).

This institutional exclusion in the land market for direct purchase in both cases makes inevitable governmental intervention in the land transition for development. Unlike the historical process of industrialisation or urbanisation in the West, where the land market has developed gradually, and land has been transferred mostly through direct purchase, the land market in India and China is still fragmented and the state's monopoly through regulatory control of the urban market has not been abolished. Instead, this hangover from the planned economy has been sustained and enhanced, leading to a dramatic increase in LA in the era of rapid economic growth.

### **REVENUE EXTRACTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF LA FOR DEVELOPMENT**

The exclusion of enterprise and landowners from direct purchase in land use transition and the active and strong intervention by the government provide the state with a privileged position in determining land prices. Normally, the price at which the state acquires land from rural landowners is much less than the price at which it transfers the land to enterprises. This value difference generates large amounts of income for the local government in both countries. Many studies highlight this phenomenon and refer to this kind of revenue extraction in China as 'land revenue' (*tudi caizheng 土地财政*). For instance, as Lin Yibiao (2011: 36–38) argued, the land price increased more than 40 times after acquisition in Southeast China. In India, a government agency, the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, for example, acquired land in a peri-urban area at ₹820 per sq. m and sold it to private developers at a minimum of ₹35,000 per sq. m (Sood 2011).

Land-related incomes in both countries for the local governments are of great significance. A study shows that property tax is not only essential for local governments but comprises the majority of the total revenue in key metropolitan areas in India, for example, 50 per cent of the total revenue in Bengaluru, 37 per cent in Chennai,

31 per cent–39 per cent in Hyderabad and 23 per cent–44 per cent in Kolkata in the period from 2004–5 to 2012–13. The proportion of the property tax in the income of the municipal corporation was as high as 98.9 per cent in Kolkata and 78.8 per cent in Chennai in 2004–5 (Chattopadhyay and Prasad 2015: 99). Another study suggests that land transfer fees, paid by lessees directly to the local government, make up on an average 40 per cent–50 per cent of local government budget revenue in China (Wang and Tao 2013: 30).


Nevertheless, the high proportion of land-related income for local government does not necessarily imply that it is a predatory state, which by definition seeks to maximise the profits of government rather than maximise the welfare of their constituents (Lal 1984). Instead, it is a form of state-centred development, in which the state plays multiple roles in land development, including land regulator, land incremental value extractor as well as major land investor. What the local government takes from land is invested in land development projects, for example, serviced land, roads, mass rapid transport, water works, housing, etc. in order to accelerate and guarantee rapid and large-scale land development for attracting investment or successfully expanding urban areas.

This is a normal practice in both countries and has been explored in some studies, especially in China (Chattopadhyay and Prasad 2015; Geng 2013: 69; Liu and Jiang 2005; Zhou 2013). Two notable cases will now be discussed to highlight this complicated cycle of land development driven by the local government.<sup>5</sup>

The land-related receipts in Guangzhou, China (GZ), including the land leasing fee and land-related taxes, such as contract tax (*qi shui*, 契税), property tax (*fangchan shui*, 房产税) and land value increment tax (*tudi zengzhi shui*, 土地增值税), constitute an average of 48.2 per cent of the total revenue in GZ. In India, the land-related receipts, which are comprised of the property tax and the receipts from the city infrastructure, contribute around 46 per cent of the revenue annually in Kolkata city (Figures 1 and 2). Obviously, land-related income plays a significant role in municipal government revenue in both cities. For the governmental expenditure on land (primarily on the development, expansion, upgrading and maintenance of urban infrastructure), the proportion of local revenue is as high as 38.3 per cent in GZ and 67 per cent in Kolkata. One striking difference between both places is the balance between land-related income and expenditure. The Chinese city extracts 10 per cent surplus land-related revenue and puts it to other uses while for the Indian city, 20 per cent of the land-related income deficit has to be supplemented by other resources such as transfers from the centre or state governments and loans from foreign sources including Asian Development Bank.


<sup>5</sup>The two cases were chosen based on the accessibility of their data and the importance of the two cities, Guangzhou and Kolkata. Both are considered major cities in their respective countries and have more comprehensive and complete data than many others. As explained later, the national data for both countries support the argument drawn from the experiences of these two cities (see pp. 10–12).

**Figure 1**  
Land-related Receipts and Expenditure in GZ's Revenue



**Source:** Guangzhou Municipal Government 2013–2016.

**Figure 2**  
Land-related Receipts and Expenditure in KMC Budget



**Source:** Kolkata Municipal Corporation 2009–10 to 2015–16.


However, it is misleading to conclude that in India local government invests a higher proportion of its income in land than in China since Chinese local governments have engaged in raising large amounts of government loans to amplify their investment on land development. The difference lies in the Chinese local governmental debt. In a national audit report by the National Audit Office of China (2011), up to 2011, of the RMB 10.7 trillion of the accumulated local governments' net debts,

36.72 per cent of that amount has been used for municipal infrastructure, 24.89 per cent for public transport and 10.62 per cent for land pooling. At least 72.23 per cent of local government debt has been poured into land development. In addition, the investment in security housing (*baozhangfang*, 保障房), construction work on agricultural land, forestry and irrigation, and environment protection takes another 14.31 per cent. The total expenditure on land comes to 86.54 per cent at least in the local government debt of GZ.

For GZ, at the end of 2010, the expenditure on urban construction and land purchasing and reservation was as high as 84 per cent of the accumulated government debt in the whole GZ region, with the total amount being RMB 228.9 billion (Figure 3). Almost half of the government debt is raised by several government agencies. Most of them are local investment corporations which are responsible for different forms of land investment. Furthermore, 95.2 per cent of the government debt has been incurred through loans from commercial banks, with the pooled land as the key mortgage and the income from the land, for example, land leasing fees and other government grants, as the main debt servicing resource (GZ Municipal Auditing Bureau 2012; Tao 2013).


As for India's urban local bodies (ULBs), the financial shortage in urban infrastructure prevails because of the weakness of ULBs when it comes to the distribution of financial resources (Chattopadhyay and Prasad 2015). They do not enjoy the same financial autonomy as their counterparts in China who mobilise loans directly from commercial banks. The ULBs have to rely on government grants, external loans or municipal bonds. These are typically inadequate to cover their ambitious urban construction programmes. In order to fill the gap between the huge and growing financial demand and the weak financial capabilities, cities like Kolkata have resorted to

*Figure 3*  
GZ Government Debt Accumulated Expenditure in RMB 100 Million in 2010



**Source:** Guangzhou Municipal Auditing Bureau 2012.

*Figure 4*  
Revenue Deficit and PPP in Kolkata City (in ₹ Lakhs)



**Source:** KMC Annual Budget Statements 2007–08 to 2015–16.

alternatives such as PPP and self-funding township or industrial corporations. However, the PPPs have decreased remarkably since 2010 when the All India Trinamool Congress (TMC) party became the ruling party in the state, as they claimed that they would not resort to LA for development. The city consequently suffered a great diminution of its revenue soon after that. It has witnessed growing revenue deficits accompanied by the dramatic decrease of PPP programmes (Figure 4).

Other policy instruments for megacities like Kolkata include developing land through financially independent agencies, for example, the West Bengal Housing Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (HIDCO), which has acquired land at throwaway prices, with the price increasing by hundreds of per cent following the acquisition (Chakravarty 2013). It is reported that ₹6,000 per cottah<sup>6</sup> was offered as compensation for the acquired land, and subsequently the price surged to ₹100,000 and more per cottah after it was developed (Mazumdar 2007).<sup>7</sup> However, the profit and loss account for the West Bengal HIDCO indicates that the majority of its income comes from the sale of land (94 per cent) which constitutes its key role as well as its main expenditure (87.5 per cent) between 2010–11 and 2014–15. The other expenditure of HIDCO, including administration, depreciation, prior period adjustment, taxes, etc. comprise only 13.5 per cent of the total (Table 1). The profit after taxation amounts to 6 per cent of its income, which means that

<sup>6</sup> 1 cottah/katha equals 0.02 acre.

<sup>7</sup> In 2014–15, land was sold for up to ₹360,000 per cottah (HIDCO 2014–15: 55).

**Table 1**  
**The Profit and Loss Accounts for West Bengal HIDCO Annually (in ₹ Crores)**

	2010–11	2011–12	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	Avg. %
Income:						
Sale price of land	139.14	204.45	266.83	414.28	427.74	94.0%
Sale price of EWS-II and I flats	3.23	0.46	0.33	0.99	9.19	1.0%
Other income	3.53	12.24	21.73	23.50	19.08	5.0%
Total Expenditure:	145.90	217.15	288.90	438.77	456.02	100.0%
Cost price of land sold	129.32	200.23	160.34	488.85	240.51	87.5%
Cost price of EWS flats-II	3.75	0.33	0.24	0.59	2.60	0.5%
Cost price of EWS flats-I	0.00	0.10	0.11	0.06	6.44	0.5%
Administrative and other expenses	1.93	3.41	26.44	28.72	7.96	4.8%
Depreciation	1.13	2.77	3.89	4.63	7.57	1.5%
Other expenses	0.03	0.01	7.77	8.57	59.9	4.8%
Prior period adjustment	0.004	0.21	1.57	1.86	0.26	0.3%
Total	136.154	207.06	200.34	533.27	325.18	100.0%
Profit after taxation	7.32	6.42	62.37	-89.31	95.67	6.0%

**Source:** HIDCO (2010–11–2014–15).

HIDCO functions as a kind of land development mechanism. It extracts the land rent difference and then invests it in land. In this way, the financial shortage with respect to urban infrastructure has been solved, and it attracts major companies such as Unitech, Webel, GoWb, etc., to move in and push forward the ambitious ‘smart cities’ project. Furthermore, at the same time, some residential accommodation for low-income people has been provided, which is referred as EWS-I, EWS-II in Table 1, with the subsided price ranging from ₹99,000 to ₹335,590 per unit (HIDCO 2014–15: 74–83). This is much less than the market price or the price paid by middle- or high-income families in the new town (Sengupta 2006). The goal of social welfare has thus been partially if not fully realised.

The previous analysis is not applicable just to GZ and West Bengal. As stated previously, ‘land revenue’, based mostly on lease fees, is a general phenomenon in China, where LA increases the size of the local state’s land bank and expands its land-related revenues (Tao 2013). In India, most local governments underspend due to the inefficiency of property tax collections and the surging demand for infrastructure and urban facilities.<sup>8</sup> LA has instead become an effective instrument to extract the surplus land for development. SEZ, industrial parks and smart cities like New Town, Kolkata have been established under government agencies to provide basic urban infrastructure

<sup>8</sup> The average underspending in ULBs in India is as high as 76 per cent (Mohanty et al., 2007: 112).

and facilities through acquisition of vast amounts of cheap rural land. Surplus land has been acquired for development projects, such as airports and subways, and developed into commercial uses in order to cover the huge construction costs of such projects (Balakrishnan 2017). In addition, large amounts of land are forcibly assembled by the state and transferred to private developers in order to attract investment and expand the local government's tax base. LA thus plays a significant role in overcoming India's cumbersome process of land transfer and in financing land development (Chattopadhyay and Prasad 2015; Sengupta 2006).

Therefore, the manipulation of LA works wonders for the ambitious developmental state. Land is acquired at the cheapest rate and its value increases dozens of times after acquisition. The state captures the surplus and amplifies its financial capabilities in order to accomplish its development goals.

### **COMPULSION: THE FLAWED CONTOURS OF LAND ACQUISITION**

The LA regimes in India and China have both been inherited from the earlier regimes originating in the planned economies or, in India's case, even earlier in the colonial era. For instance, the compensation paid by the Chinese local government for agricultural land is measured by the annual output of the land rather than its current market price which, if strictly implemented, is so small that it cannot maintain the living standards of those from whom the land was acquired.<sup>9</sup> For India, before 2014 many characteristics of the LA system which had been manipulated for the convenience of colonial rule continued, in the form of the LAA 1894. Under this law, land must be successfully acquired within two years after LA is awarded and notified by the government. Furthermore, the land acquired was to be compensated at the market price of the previous three years, which overlooks the reality of the surging land prices before or during LA. Furthermore, the rehabilitation and relocation packages for the displaced peasants were not mandated. Since the 1980s, there have been several reforms of the LA regimes but the major flaws in the LA mechanisms stood untouched until 2014.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> According to the LAL 1998, 'the total land compensation and resettlement subsidies shall not exceed 30 times the average annual output value of the requisitioned land for the three years preceding such requisition'(article 47). It, thereby, sets a limitation on the overall compensation for LA in China. Generally, in practice, in Nanan, Fujian, the one-off compensation for 1 mu of land is around RMB 30,000 (Fieldnote, 25 March 2015), and in north China, like Taian Shandong, peasants whose land are acquired have been paid a dividend of RMB 1000/mu annually or a one-off compensation ranging from RMB 18,000 to RMB 40,000 (Fieldnote, 26 January 2016). The compensation is low and seen as leading to impoverishment of the peasants.

<sup>10</sup> While this article focuses on LA in both countries from the 1980s to 2013, since 2014 both China and India have implemented major reforms of their LA regimes.

First, LA for public purpose/use has not been clearly defined, and in some cases it is completely ignored in both countries. In China, the Constitution and the LAL mandates that LA shall be carried on in accordance with the public benefit, while the monopoly of the local government and the ban on the free transfer between agricultural landowners and companies results in benefit for the local authorities. In an extraordinary case, the local government even acquired land for a shoemaking factory from the public school in the name of public benefit (Wang and Tao 2013). India's 1962 reform of the LAA provides the legality of LA for private companies which have more than 100 employees (LAA, 1962, amended, provision 38). But criticism against this has increased rapidly after that, particularly since the landmark 1991 reforms in the direction of economic liberalisation. This coincides with several other inherent institutional flaws in the LA mechanism, including how to justify the fact that those from whom land is acquired have to sacrifice their own benefit in the name of the public good, when the benefit, in fact, goes to a private company. The ambiguous definition of public purpose in the land law and the large-scale LA for private companies is bound to incur discontent and lead to resistance (Levien 2013: 79).

Second, LA is abused in both countries not only in terms of the scale and frequency of the projects, but also in the sense of the scale of LA in comparison with direct purchase or equitable negotiation of the price. In countries such as the United States and Germany, LA is the last resort for the local authorities after all other instruments have been tried and exhausted. Usually, the government uses the power of eminent domain to the minimum extent possible and assembles the land generally by direct purchase or by negotiation with the landowners (Porter 2007: 5; Slovenije 2014: 47). However, in most cases in India or China, the local government compulsorily acquires land under the LA laws, by which the compensation is frequently much lower than market value. Even in the few exceptional cases when the government purchases land from peasants, normally the price is not much higher than the rate it pays in accordance with the LA laws. Moreover, peasants are excluded from sharing the benefit of land development. Taking the Rajarhat New Town in Kolkata, for example, among the whole 2,862 ha of the land that the HIDCO has acquired, only 101.17 ha has been purchased, and the other 2716 ha has been compulsorily acquired (HIDCO 2011–12: 3). There is no significant difference in the average price of the land between the two (Chakravarty 2013: 65). In China, according to the land laws, direct purchase is adopted only in the case of housing demolition when the government takes over urban houses for urban renewal projects or other purposes. Direct purchasing is not mandated in LA when the government acquires land from rural regions and transforms it into urban land. So the peasants do not have any right to negotiate or bargain with the government over selling their land but have to just submit to a much lower price set by the LAL.

Third, criticisms arise against LA in both India and China, such as under-compensation, the lack of a satisfactory rehabilitation and relocation package (R&R), the brutality and violence against the landowners and land use right holders by the

local authorities, the use of LA as a form of speculation by the local governments as well as absence of appropriate judicial remedies (Cheng 2006; Glasgow 2013; Nielsen 2009; Sarkar 2011). As result, LA has regularly had an adverse impact on those from whom land has been acquired, especially when they belong to the lower classes of society, such as the Adivasis and Dalits in India (Fernandes 2007). Unsurprisingly, protests against LA and conflicts between local government and peasants who lost their land have increased sharply since the end of the 1990s. Some of the hotspots include Singur and Nandigram in West Bengal, the anti-POSCO agitation in Odisha, the Yamuna Expressway in Uttar Pradesh, the Sardar Sarovar Nigam Dam in Gujarat and Moolampilly in Kerala. In China, Wukan in Guandong, Pingdu in Shandong, Junningin Yunnan, etc. have been covered in the public media. According to a survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 65 per cent of the conflicts in rural regions in 2005 were caused by LA (Yu 2009). A public opinion analysis report by the *People's Daily* website indicated that violence during housing demolition and compensation disputes over LA cause the greatest damage to government–people relations (Zhu et al. 2011). LA in India is a serious political issue. In West Bengal, the 34-year reign of Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)] ended, in part, due to the controversial and furious conflicts about LA in Singur and Nandigram.

The social impact of LA in India and China is more complicated. As Sanjoy Chakravorty (2013) pointed out, LA in both countries has been a mixed bag. The benefits for peasants who gave up their land can be seen in cases such as that of Sanand in Gujarat and the Khed SEZ in Pune in India, and Foshan New Town, Shenzhen in Guangdong and Chengdu in Sichuan in China (Balakrishnan 2013; Liu and Jiang 2005; NSD 2010). Peasants become millionaires after the LA as a result of innovative policies adopted by local governments. The land users participated in the development and enjoyed some of the increased value of land development. Many others would welcome LA by the government under the same conditions.

Nevertheless, in India, even the new legislation, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act, 2013, has not ended the controversies and the difficulties involved in LA. Soon after the passage of the new Act, a new government was formed at the Centre. The new ruling coalition, the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, was not satisfied with the Act, and subsequently revised it with new ordinances. The new central government tried to bring another new LAA, but was frustrated by the opposition parties in Parliament. Thus LA, one of the key challenges to India's ambitious development commitment, has still not been settled. In China, several CPC Congress Reports have laid stress on the reformation of the land system and LA institutions since the early twenty-first century to allow, for instance, rural developed land to enter the urban land market. This could break the monopoly of the state in the urban land market, but the reform has not been carried out fully. Only certain regions selected by the Ministry of Land and Resources have been experimenting with this reform.

Thus we can see that the flawed contours of LA in India and China have been sustained for decades, and this subject hence deserves serious analysis from the standpoint of political economy. The most striking feature which cannot be ignored is the basic character of LA. Compulsory purchase represents the substantive essence of LA; it is a coercive power entrusted to the state for public betterment. The coercion lies in the fact that the willingness or unwillingness of the property owners to surrender their land is disregarded. To refrain from the abuse of this privileged and mandatory state power as well as to compensate and protect the rights of those who give up their land, several norms regarding LA have been formulated and are widely accepted. These include 'public purpose/public use', 'fair compensation' and 'procedural constraint on the taking', etc. (Davies 1985; Nichols 1917; Schubert 1960). The foregoing description of the flawed mechanism of LA in India and China shows that it obviously violates these norms and thus not only does not ameliorate the impact of compulsion on those who lose their land but instead enhances their sense of injustice, deprivation and loss.

### **COMPULSORY DEVELOPMENT AS AN IDEAL TYPE AND ITS VARIATIONS**


The previous sections introduced the basic and essential features of LA in India and China, which include three elements:

1. Institutional exclusion in the land market, particularly for land transfer requiring use changes, leading to difficulties in assembling large amounts of land for industrial and urban purposes through direct purchase.
2. Land value extraction by the local governments.
3. A strong element of compulsion imposed on those who lose their land.

All three elements are created and sustained by the state in order to establish a development model in which government manipulates land policies to its advantage, speculates in the land market to maximise rent and then extracts huge land surpluses for its development purposes (Figure 5).

Unlike the developed world in the West, which has a unitary and advanced land market, the land markets in India and China are either fragmented or separated, underdeveloped or unevenly developed due to strict land control policies. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a private developer to assemble land by itself through direct purchase when a large amount of agricultural land is needed for urban expansion or industrialisation purposes. The state, mostly represented by local urban governments, has to step in and use LA to assemble land and transfer it to developers with or without charge. However, the state has a strong revenue incentive in this arena. LA for this purpose accelerates the process of land transition, enhances economic growth and, in the long run, helps expand the revenue base for the local government, which relies heavily on

*Figure 5*  
The Ideal Type of LA Regime in India and China



Source: The author.

land-related income. At the same time, and in the short run, land speculation significantly amplifies the local government's financial capacity to promote development projects such as infrastructure, public housing and industrial parks. The monetisation of land is an inevitable element in the development in both countries (Balakrishnan 2017; Tao 2013). Without a compulsory power such as the involuntary LA by the state, this development model would not have been possible. The low amounts paid in compensation enlarge the already huge land value gap between undeveloped land and serviced land. The state's power ensures that these coercive transactions can be accomplished regardless of the willingness of those deprived of their land. In addition, the flawed contours of the LA, even though criticised furiously by civil society in both countries, persist and compound the harm done to those who have lost their land.


This land development model is an ideal type. As defined by Max Weber, 'an ideal type' in this sense is 'a mental construct for the scrutiny and systematic characterization of individual concrete patterns, which are significant in their uniqueness' (Weber 1949: 100). It is neither historical reality nor even the 'true' reality (*ibid.*: 93). Instead, each ideal type comprises both generic and typically constructed 'conceptual elements' (*ibid.*: 100). By abstracting and emphasising certain conceptually essential elements, an ideal type provides 'a purely ideal concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components' (*ibid.*: 93).

Compulsory development is a concept which we are putting forward in this article because it highlights three fundamental and unique elements of LA politics in India and China. The developmental state incorporates, or more precisely, manipulates the three elements to make up a stable and sustained development model in both countries.

Limited by previous research methodology, the vast differences between both countries in LA have not been explored in the literature. Describing all the differences here is not possible due to space limitations; furthermore, doing so would also go far beyond the scope of this paper. However, a quick and brief observation of the differences of LA in practice is appropriate. The various forms of compulsory development will be identified in later studies as we develop the ideal type of compulsory development using more detailed models based on the practice of LA in both countries (Figure 6).

First of all, generally speaking, compulsory development in China is relatively stronger than in India. For instance, the legal framework of land policy in China excludes the property owners from developing their own land completely. Local governments also extract most, if not all, of the incremental value from the acquired land, and their annual revenues rely heavily on those value transfers. In contrast, value extraction and revenue contribution are less significant in India. In addition, due to the asymmetry of the power between the state and society, Chinese deprived of their land are generally less likely to receive a reasonable remedy for their grievances. For example, a survey revealed that 86.5 per cent of the landowners who sought redress from the courts in India were awarded greater compensation than offered by the state, while in China the courts found for the landowner only in 17.9 per cent of the LA lawsuits filed (*China Land and Resource Almanac* 1999–2015; Wahi et al. 2017: 25); this was despite India's judicial system being much slower than the Chinese system.

*Figure 6*  
The Variations of Compulsory Development



**Source:** The author.

Another difference is institutional. NGOs, social activists, opposition parties and journalists in India often actively support those deprived of their land and have strengthened the latter's resistance towards coercive LA. In contrast, in China they enjoy far less support from civil society. They instead must hope for the intervention of a higher authority, which does not happen often. Hence, the process of contention between landowners and the state is different in the two countries due to the differences in political regimes.

Second, the compulsory aspect of LA can be enhanced or softened in practice in both countries. The practice of LA in one locality will likely be significantly different from that in another locality. This is because the subnational and local governments have direct jurisdiction over land and significant concerns about land use issues. The practice of LA in a certain locality will also likely change after a shift in the local political economy. Given this sensitivity to specific local factors, various models of LA have appeared in both countries. In some cases, the three elements highlighted previously are modified: those who give up their land take a share in the benefit of development or participate directly in the land development. As indicated earlier, this is what happened in Sanand, Gujarat and Foshan New Town. Peasants who parted with their land became millionaires after the LA and they were satisfied with the whole process (Fieldnote 19 September 2015).<sup>11</sup> Compulsory development can also be enhanced by the subnational state or local authorities. For instance, the LA in Nandigram and Singur in West Bengal, as well as the LA for the national highway towards the International Container Terminal Project in Kerala, along with many others, resulted in violent clashes between police and resisters in India (Chitra 2013; Fieldnote 17 August 2016; Fieldnote 29 July 2015; Fieldnote 30 August 2015). As for China, in many cases like Pingba of Guizhou and Pingdu of Shandong, furious contention followed the LA there (Fieldnote 26 January 2015; Fieldnote 28 January 2016; Wang and Yang 2014). Low compensation, government brutality, violation of the LA laws, etc. also took place, which intensified the effect of the compulsion employed by the state to stimulate rapid economic growth.

Because compulsory development is presented in this paper as an ideal type and a 'mental construct', it is only intended to capture the simplest and most essential characteristics which prevail in LA as practised in both countries. It does not claim that all the stories of LA are the same in both countries. Indeed, numerous other factors under different contexts arise and shape the diverse processes and operation of LA in both countries. All these factors must be taken into account, and each LA transaction must also be observed case-by-case because, as mentioned earlier, compulsory development has been practised in a multitude of forms depending on the context.

<sup>11</sup> For further evidence, the practice of land assembling and LA in some regions of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, etc., in India, and Sichuan, Foshan, Xiamen, and so on in China deserve more attention (Balakrishna 2013; Jiang and Liu 2003; NSD 2010, Vijayabaskar 2010). Field work also was conducted by the author in Sanand, Gujarat, in 2015, and in Foshan in 2015 and 2017 (Fieldnotes 19 September 2015; Fieldnotes 18 January 2015; Fieldnotes 25 July 2017)

### **DISCUSSION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NOTION OF COMPULSORY DEVELOPMENT**

The notion of compulsory development points to a form of the developmental state which involves the state's active intervention in, and its power to drive, development. But it can be distinguished from the normal developmental state. Compulsion by the state is far more prominent during the drive to rapidly increase economic growth or to improve economic productivity. In developmental states, in general, the government monitors the market and manipulates land prices and also actively sponsors government-business cooperation to accomplish national development goals (Öniş 1991). However, the scope and extent of compulsion in the compulsory development approach in India and China far surpasses that evident in the developmental states of other East Asian countries. For instance, LA in Korea during its economic take-off era did not become a major social issue. As M. G. Kitay (1985: 137) stated, 'Most (land) transactions have been made through negotiation. Until 1980, all purchases were made by negotiation. In 1981, about 1.6 percent of purchase were made through eminent domain, and 1982 11.9 percent'. Only since the late 1980s, after 20 years of rapid industrialisation, have the appeals and lawsuits over the application of eminent domain increased dramatically in Korea (Cho 2017: 218). Taiwan's development prior to the 1990s had characteristics similar to compulsory development; the Land Value Tax and the Land Increment Tax, which were also based on LA, comprised about 70 per cent of local tax collections in the early 1990s and also led to huge public discontent (Grange et al. 2006; Xu 1986). However, the situation began to change with the arrival of political democratisation in Taiwan at the end of 1980s. New land policies, such as land pooling and land consolidation, were introduced thereafter. The consent of the landowners has now been built into land development projects, and at least 40 per cent of the developed area is now returned to the original owners through the zone expropriation policy (Grange et al. 2006). In short, there is no longer a compulsory development model in Taiwan.

The notion of compulsory development also differs from the existing literature about the political economy of development of China and India. It is not in conformity with the neo-liberal doctrine (Da Costa 2007) in the sense that the state's intervention in development plays an overwhelming role that relies on compulsion; this is something more than merely enacting policy levers that promote the liberal economic doctrines of privatisation, liberalisation and globalisation. It also goes far beyond the pro-business state that some scholars refer to (Kohli 2009). The market and the private sector have limited access to the state's power to redistribute resources through regulation. The state emphasises its need to manage, rather than market, precious resources like land. Compulsory Development takes maximum advantage of the benefits of market mechanisms and state intervention in an opportunistic way to promote rapid economic growth.

Furthermore, the discourse on the politics of dispossession, accumulation and displacement for development (Fernandes 2008; Levien 2013) has succeeded in identifying

the allies of the state and the capitalists and the developmental costs imposed by them on the weaker sections of society in many situations. But, in some other cases, the discourse of dispossession has been overstated. It ignores the large amount of willing immigration to urban regions and the obvious decline of the agricultural workforce even in rural regions in the ongoing process of industrialisation and urbanisation. As Partha Chatterjee pointed out, a radical transformation of peasant culture has taken place in India, and we can find 'a generation of peasants whose principal motivation seems to be to stop being peasants' (Chatterjee 2008: 59). Stressing the peasants' reliance on land fails to take into consideration the rapid transformations underway in both countries. There are also always numerous parties who voluntarily surrender their land and keenly anticipate projects even in the most controversial acquisitions (Fieldnote 29 July, 2015; Sathe 2016).<sup>12</sup> Development is not necessarily achieved only through accumulation in which only one party benefits from development at the cost of the others. Many cases of LA in India and China indicate that the land surplus induced by development can be shared by stakeholders and welcomed by the localities as we depicted in the preceding section. An effective benefit-sharing mechanism can smoothen the LA process and contribute to inclusive development.

Compulsory development, the ideal type of LA outlined in this article, is an ethically neutral conception (Weber 1949). It focuses solely on the empirical facts of LA in both countries and does not comment on the value of LA to either society. Normative discussions are outside the scope of this discussion. The theoretical significance of 'compulsory development' is twofold: first, it highlights the fundamental and essential similarities of LA in both countries and tries to understand it at a conceptual level. Earlier in this article, this was used as the basis for further comparison of LA between both countries. Second, unlike the existing literature, compulsory development highlights and explores the correlations between compulsion and development in a neoliberal economic era, which has not been adequately examined theoretically.

## CONCLUSION

In this study, the practice of LA in India and China from the 1980s until 2013 has been theoretically elaborated as the concept of compulsory development. There is a convergence of the three most fundamental elements of the LA in both countries. Compulsory development includes the institutional exclusion in the land market of a large number of land use changes, the extraction of land value by the state for development and persistent flawed LA regimes which intensify the effect of compulsion on

<sup>12</sup> Field work was conducted by the author in Singur, West Bengal on 29 July 2015. Many local villagers, including Congress carders and some Muslim marginal landholders, regretted joining the anti-Tata Nano movement. And the TMC members stick to their standpoint against introducing the project there.

those who lose their land. As an ideal type, this notion depicts the core similarities of LA in both countries: the use of compulsory power for development purposes despite the possible resistance. As the primary phase of a larger and more wide-ranging study, this article is meant to lay the groundwork for further research and analysis. Further research will investigate the various forms of compulsory development and provide more comprehensive interpretation of its variations.<sup>13</sup>

### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The author expresses his gratitude to two unknown referees for valuable comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.

### **DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS**

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

### **FUNDING**

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author expresses his gratitude to Harvard–Yenching Institute for granting a visiting scholarship to work in the Institute for a year (2017–2018), when the draft of this article was completed. This research was supported by the National Social Science Fund of China (Grant No. 14CZZ009) and Key Research Institute of China (Grant No. 16JJD630012).

### **REFERENCES**

- Bakore, Makarand. 2007. ‘*Urban Land Ceiling Act: Appeal to Repeal*’, CCS Series on NURM Reforms, No.5, February, 1–6.
- Balakrishnan, Sai. 2013. *Land Conflicts and Cooperatives along Pune’s Highways: Managing India’s Agrarian to Urban Transition*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University.

<sup>13</sup> Several papers analysing LA in both countries have been completed by the author, and were presented during the Harvard–Yenching Institute ‘Land Policy in Asia’ workshop (3 May 2018) and the AAS-in-Asia conference in Delhi (6 July 2018).

- . 2017. 'Land-based Financing for Infrastructure: What is New about India's Land Conflicts?', in R. Nagaraj and Sripad Motiram (eds), *Political Economy of Contemporary India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 260–78.
- Chakravarty, Arpana. 2013. *State-led Neoliberalism? Exploring the Politics of Urban Land Development in India*, Unpublished MA dissertation, The University of Guelph.
- Chakravorty, Sanjoy. 2013. *The Price of Land: Acquisition, Conflict, Consequence*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Chatterjee, P. 2008. 'Democracy and Economic Transformation in India', *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol. 43, No. 16, April, 53–62.
- Chattopadhyay, Soumyadip and Smriti Prasad. 2015. 'Urban Property Tax in India: Problems and Prospects', *Journal of Economic Policy and Research*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 92–110.
- Chitra, P. K. 2013. *Politics of Land Acquisition and Conversion: With Reference to Two Development Projects in Kerala*, Tata Institute of Social Sciences.
- Cheng Jie (程洁). 2006. 'Tudi zhengshou zhengyongzhong de chengxu shifan yu chongjian' (土地征收征用中的程序失范与重建) [The Procedural Disorder and Its Reconstruction in the Land Acquisition], *Faxue Yanjiu* (法学研究), Vol. 28, No. 1, 62–78.
- Cho, Byungkoo. 2017. 'Just Compensation in Eminent Domain in Korea from the Perspective of Fairness', in Kim, Iljoong, Lee, Hojun and Somin Ilya (eds), *Eminent Domain: A Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 208–29.
- Da Costa, Dia. 2007. 'Tensions of Neoliberal Development: State Discourse and Dramatic Oppositions in West Bengal', *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, Vol. 41, No. 3, 287–320.
- Davies, Keith. 1985. *Law of Compulsory Purchase and Compensation*, London: Butterworths Law.
- Fernandes, Walter. 2007. 'Singur and the Displacement Scenario', *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 203–6.
- . 2008. 'India's Forced Displacement Policy and Practice: Is Compensation up to Its Role in India's Resettlement Policy?', in M. C. Michael and H. M. Mathus (eds), *Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? Reforming Resettlement Through Investments and Benefit-Sharing*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 180–207.
- Geng Yu (耿羽). 2013. 'Zhengqian zhengzhi: jiceng zhili shifa zhong de Baisha qu tudi kaifa (1990–2013)' (征迁政治——基层治理视阈下的白沙区土地开发 [1990–2013]) [*Political Activity on Land-Acquisition and House-Demolition—Land Development in Baisha District from the Perspective of Grassroots Governance*], Unpublished PhD. dissertation, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, China.
- Glasgow, Susan. 2013. 'Dynamics of Land Acquisition. Challenges and Opportunities by the Ganga Expressway Project in North India: A Case Study', *American Journal of Governance and Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 39–25.
- Grange, Adrienne La, Chin-Oh Chang and Ngai Ming Yip. 2006. 'Commodification and Urban Development: A Case Study of Taiwan', *Housing Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 53–76.
- Guangzhou Municipal Auditing Bureau. 2012. 'Guanyu Guangzhoushi difang zhengfuxing zhaiwu Shenji jieguo de Baogao' (关于广州市地方政府性债务审计结果的报告) [An Auditing Report About the Local Governmental Debts of Guangzhou], *The Standing committee of Guangzhou People Congress Gazette* (广州人大常委会公报), Vol. 271, No. 9–10, 125–35.
- Guangzhou Municipal Government (2013–2016). 'Annual Guangzhou Budget Report' (广州市预算执行情况和预算草案的报告), [http://www.gz.gov.cn/gzgov/s16788/zdly\\_list\\_2.shtml](http://www.gz.gov.cn/gzgov/s16788/zdly_list_2.shtml) (accessed on 31 December 2017).
- HIDCO. 2010-11–2015-16. *HIDCO Annual Report*, [http://www.wbhidcoltd.com/org\\_desc.php?pg=inv\\_common&typ=common&tag=rnp\\_com](http://www.wbhidcoltd.com/org_desc.php?pg=inv_common&typ=common&tag=rnp_com) (accessed on 20 October 2017).
- Jiang Shengsan and Liu Shouying (蒋省三, 刘守英). 2003. 'Tudi zibenhua yu nongcun gongyehua: Guangdongsheng Foshansi nanhai jingjifazhan diaocha' (土地资本化与农村工业化: 广东省佛山市南海经济发展调查) [The Capitalization of Land and the Rural Industrialization: An Economic Survey on Nanhai, Foshan, Guangdong), *Guanli Shijie* (管理世界), No. 11, 87–97.

- Kitay, Michael G. 1985. *Land Acquisition in Developing Countries: Policies and Procedures of the Public Sector*, Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain.
- Kohli, Atul. 2006. 'Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980–2005 (Part I: The 1980s)', *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol. 41, No. 14, April 8, 1251–370.
- . 2009. *Democracy and Development: Essays on State, Society, and Economy*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Kolkata Municipal Corporation. 2009–10 to 2015–16. 'Annual Budget Statement, Official Website of KMC', <https://www.kmcgov.in/KMCPortal/jsp/AboutUsVision.jsp> (accessed 10 October 2017).
- Lal, Deepak. 1984. 'Political Economy of the Predatory State', Unpublished Paper Prepared for the Western Economic Association Meeting, Las Vegas, June, 24–8.
- Levien, Michael James. 2013. *Regimes of Dispossession: Special Economic Zones and the Political Economy of Land in India*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.
- Lin Yibiao (林依标). 2011. *Bei zhengdi nongmin chayixing shouchang yiyuan yanjiu: yi Fujiansheng wei li* (被征地农民差异性受偿意愿研究：以福建省为例) [Studies on the Varied Willingness of Being Compensated for Land Acquired of the Peasants in the Cases of Fujian Provinces]. Fuzhou: Renmin Chubanshe.
- Liu Shouying and Shengsan Jiang (刘守英, 蒋省三). 2005. 'Tudi rongzi yu caizheng he jinrong fengxian: laizhi dongbu yige fada diqu de ge'an' (土地融资与财政风险——来自东部一个发达地区的案例) [Financial Risks of Land Financing by Local Governments: Case Study of a Developed Area in East China], *Zhongguo tudi kexue* (中国土地科学), Vol. 19, No. 5, 3–9.
- Ministry of Land and Resource of the People's Republic of China. 1999–2015. *China Land and Resource Almanac* (《中国土地资源年鉴》). Beijing, China Land and Resource Almanac Editorial Department.
- Mohanty, P. K., B. M. Misra, R. Goyal and P. D. Jeromi. 2007. 'Municipal Finance in India: An assessment'. DRG Study No. 26, Department of Economic Analysis and Policy, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
- Mao Yushi (茅于轼). 2009. 'Huifu Nongmin Dui Tudi Caican de Suoyouquan' (恢复农民对土地财产的所有权) [Return the Land Ownership to Peasants], *Jianshe Shichang Bao* (建设市场报), February.
- Mazumdar, Jaideep. 2007. 'This Land Is Our Land..., Outlook'. 10 January, <https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/this-land-is-our-land/233578> (accessed on 20 October 2017).
- National Audit Office of China (国家审计署). 2011. 'Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Shenjishu Shenji Jieguo Gonggao' (《中华人民共和国审计署审计结果公报》) [A National Audit Report by the National Audit Office of China], Chinese National Audit Office Document, Vol. 35, No. 104.
- Nichols, Philip. 1917. *The Law of Eminent Domain: A Treatise on the Principles which Affect the Taking of Property for the Public Use* (2nd ed.), New York, NY: Albany.
- Nielsen, KennethBo. 2009. 'Farmer's Use of the Courts in an Anti-land Acquisition Movement in West Bengal', *Journal of Legal Pluralism*, Vol. 41, No. 59, 121–144.
- NSD (National School of Development, Peking University) (北京大学国家发展研究院). 2010. *Huanquan funeng: dianding changqi fazhan de kekao jichu—Chengdu tudi zhidu gaige shijian diaocha baogao* (还权赋能：奠定长期发展的可靠基础——成都土地制度改革实践调查报告) [The Road to Property Rights Delineation: Experience of Chengdu, China], Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe.
- Öniş, Ziya. 1991. 'The logic of the Developmental State', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 109–126.
- Porter, Douglas R. 2007. *Eminent Domain: An Important Tool for Community Revitalization*, Washington, DC: Urban Land Institute.
- Ray, Subhash C. 2015. 'On the Question of Land Acquisition for Private Development: Lessons from the United States, India, and China', *Emerging Economy Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 71–89.
- Ren, Xuefei. 2017. 'Land Acquisition, Rural Protests, and the Local State in China and India', *Environment and Planning*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 25–41.
- Sarkar, Swagato. 2011. 'The Impossibility of Just Land Acquisition', *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol. 46, No. 41, 35–38.

- Sathe, Dhanmanjiri. 2016. 'Land Acquisition: Need for a Shift in Discourse', *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol. 51, No. 51, 52–58.
- Schubert, Richard S. 1960. 'Compensation Under New German Legislation on Expropriation', *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 84–94.
- Sengupta, Urmi. 2006. 'Government Intervention and Public-Private Partnerships in Housing Delivery in Kolkata', *Habitat International*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 448–61.
- Seshadri, Triyakshana. 2011. *The Political Economy of Special Economic Zone in India*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, George Mason University.
- Sivam, Alpana. 2002. 'Constraints Affecting the Efficiency of the Urban Residential Land Market in Developing Countries: A Case Study of India', *Habitat International*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 523–37.
- Slovenije, Glasilo Z. G. 2014. 'Land Consolidation for Large-scale Infrastructure Projects in Germany', *Journal of the Association of Surveyors of Slovenia*, Vol. 58, No. 1, 46–68.
- Sood, Jyotika. 2011. 'Road to Disaster', *Down to Earth*. 17 August, <http://www.downtoearth.org.in/coverage/road-to-disaster-33563> (accessed on 31 December 2017).
- Tao Ran (陶然). 2013. 'Tudi rongzi moshi de xianzhuang yu fengxian' (土地融资模式的现状与风险) [The Status and Risks of Land Leveraging Finance], *Guotu ziyuan daokan* (国土资源导刊), Vol. 84, No. 8, 26–30.
- Wang Ruifeng and Yang Feng (王瑞锋, 杨锋). 2014. 'Nongmin Kang Zhengdi Zhu Zhangpeng Yejian Qihuo Yisi Shanshang' (农民抗征地住帐篷夜间起火1死3伤) [1 Peasant Burnt Dead and 3 injured in Pingdu during their night watch for their land against land acquisition], *Xin Jingbao* (新京报), 22 March 2014, A13. [http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2014/03/22/node\\_20.htm](http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2014/03/22/node_20.htm) (accessed 31 December 2017).
- Vijayabaskar, M. 2010. 'Saving Agricultural Labour from Agriculture: SEZs and Politics of Silence in Tamil Nadu', *Economic & Political Weekly*, Vol. 45, No. 6, 36–43.
- Wahi, Namita, Ankit Bhatia, Pallav Shukla, Dhruva Gandhi, Shubham Jain and Upasana Chauhan. 2017. *Land Acquisition in India: A Review of Supreme Court Cases (1950–2016)*, <http://www.cprindia.org/research/reports/land-acquisition-india-review-supreme-court-cases-1950-2016> (accessed on 31 December 2017).
- Wang Hui and Tao Ran (汪晖, 陶然). 2013. *Zhongguo tudi zhidu gaige: Nandian tupo he zhengce zuhe* (中国土地制度改革: 难点、突破与政策组合) [Chinese Land Acquisition Reform: Issues, Advances and Policies Package]. Beijing: Shangwu yinshu guan.
- Weber, Max. 1949. *On the Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Xu Wenchang (许文昌). 1986. *Tudi Jingjixue Xinlun* (土地经济学新论) [A New Discussion on Land Economics]. Taipei: Wensheng Book Store.
- Yu Jianrong (于建嵘). 2009. 'Dangqian woguo quntixing shijian de zhuyao leixing jiqi jiben tezheng' (当前我国群体性事件的主要类型及其基本特征) [Major Types and Basic Characteristics of Group Event in Today's China], *Zhongguo zhengfa daxue xuebao* (中国政法大学学报), Vol. 14, No. 9, 114–60.
- Zhang Xiaobo. 2007. 'Asymmetric Property Rights in China's Economic Growth', *William Mitchell Law Review*, Vol. 33, No. 2, 567–90.
- Zhou Qiren (周其仁). 2013. *Gaige de luoji* (改革的逻辑) [The Logic of Reformation]. Beijing: Zhongxin Chubanshe.
- Zhu Huixin, Xuegang Shan and Jiangchun Hu. 2011. '2011nianZhongguo hulianwang yuqing fenxi baogao' (2011年中国互联网舆情分析报告) [A Research Report on the Chinese Online Public Opinion, 2011], Renminwang (人民网), <http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40606/13489601.html> (accessed on 10 October 2017).