



The Case for Collecting Hate Crimes Data in India

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There has been increasing attention on mob lynching because of high profile cases of anti-minority violence over the last few years. In July 2018, the Supreme Court of India laid down guidelines in mob violence and lynching cases in response to public interest litigations that had questioned the adequacy of state handling of these cases. The proper implementation of some of these guidelines requires the existence of rigorous data. The National Crimes Record Bureau (NCRB), which collects official crimes data in India, reportedly has decided to collect data on "mob lynching". In this paper, the author critiques the adoption of this category, particularly in the context of NCRB's existing methodological limitations. He argues that NCRB should adopt the category of "hate crimes" because it is more pertinent to the contemporary crisis and less vague than other categories. Analyzing some of the transnational data collection models, the author proposes a combination of categories and methodologies that will do justice to the formulation of future policy on the issue.

I. Introduction

With a perceptible rise in media-covered incidents of mob lynching against minorities, the issue of hate crimes has come into relatively sharp focus. The typical anatomy of these incidents involves violence against individuals by mobs, often on the pretext of cow protection or inter-faith relationships, who record and circulate the videos of these incidents over social media. Many of these incidents have involved alleged perpetrators who are affiliated with right-wing organizations and political parties. In-depth media reports suggest that many cow-protection gangs or *gau raksha dals* are organized and run as extortion scams.¹ What makes all this particularly concerning, as noted by numerous human rights and journalistic reports, is the complicity and indifference of the police.²

The grave nature of the problem has drawn the Indian Supreme Court into the controversy. Starting last year, the Court had started issuing orders in response to petitions, primarily to ensure better policing to address the problem of cow-related mob violence.³ On July 17, 2018, the Supreme Court delivered a detailed order that specified a long list of guidelines for the police and the state governments in the *Tehseen Poonawala* case.⁴ These guidelines included preventive measures (like designated officers to prevent violence, official sensitization and prevention of hate speech), remedial measures (like fast tracking of cases and protection to witnesses and victims) and punitive measures (like command responsibility for state officials). It "recommended" that Parliament formulate "a separate offence for lynching and provide adequate punishment."⁵

One of the important guidelines in *Tehseen Poonawala* was that the state and police must use data in order to locate hotspots and address cases of mob violence. This was not the first time the question of data had come up in the debate around mob violence. Since 2015, members of Parliament on numerous occasions have asked the Central Government to provide data on the number of cases of mob violence, lynching and other violent incidents involving cow protection, inter-faith relationships or child-abduction.⁶

The Government responded to these requests by stating that the official data gatherer, the National Crimes Record Bureau (NCRB), did not collect crimes data on any of these categories. This was correct. NCRB does collect data on riots, including communal and caste riots, as well as data on murders motivated by categories like communalism and casteism.⁷ But none of these categories speak directly to categories like mob violence or lynching.

In absence of official data, non-state sources like news media have been the primary sources of data on contemporary mob violence and lynching. The most widely received data, provided by the independent media portal Indiaspend.in has reported that since 2012, as many as 308 persons have been victims of 94 incidents of cow-related violence till September 3, 2018.⁸ Indiaspend.in operates another web-based database called 'Citizen's Religious Hate-Crime Watch', which is expected to launch by the end of September 2018 and records religion-based hate crimes.⁹ Indiaspend.in collects its data from English news sources and consequently does not claim that its numbers are exhaustive. Other sources rely on different definitions. The portal haltthehate.com operated by Amnesty International documents "hate crimes" from English and Hindi media sources.¹⁰ It has been recording acts of violence directed against religious and caste minority groups since September 2015. Its numbers show a total of 603 incidents till September 3, 2018.

While these and many other efforts of recording data on the contemporary crisis of mob violence and lynching are welcome, it is clear that the magnitude of the problem requires investment of a much higher scale. For obvious reasons, the independent media outlets are unable to verify their numbers or go substantially beyond what the news has been reporting.

Perhaps partly in response to the growing attention to mob violence, including constant demands in the political space, NCRB appears to have decided to collect data on "mob lynching" in the next round of crimes data collection.¹¹

About the Author

Dr. M. Mohsin Alam Bhat as an assistant professor of law, and Executive-Director of the Centre for Public Interest Law at Jindal Global Law School. This essay is part of the larger work of his Centre that involves research on hate crimes, mob violence and data collection. He runs a legal clinic on hate crimes and criminal justice system, which involves the students of the university in conducting empirical research in collaboration with human rights defenders, advocates and activists.

In this piece, I shall critique NCRB's decision to use this category. Firstly, I shall argue that these categories are not pertinent to the nature and urgency of the crisis, which in contemporary times has gained substantial political and legal attention. Secondly, these categories are vague and imprecise to meaningfully assist future policy. This problem is made more severe by the problems that inhere in the NCRB's data collection methodologies.

Rather than adopting these categories, I suggest that India should collect data on the category of "hate crimes". This category is more pertinent to the contemporary crisis; and partly owing to the extensive transnational legislative and data-collection practices, is far better defined.¹²

I offer two models that can be used to conduct hate crimes data collection in India. The more ambitious suggestion is the creation of an independent hate crimes monitoring system that deviates from NCRB's existing routes to data. The less ambitious suggestion, but a suggestion that nevertheless addresses the issues of pertinence and precision, is for NCRB to collect data on "hate crimes" separately, accompanied by extensive training of police personnel in data collection alongside appropriate amendments to NCRB's data collection methodologies.

II. Hate Crimes in Contemporary India

On June 22, 2017, a 16-year old Muslim boy, Junaid Khan was stabbed to death by a group of persons on board a train from Delhi to Faridabad. The stabbing was reportedly preceded by an altercation over seats. Soon, a mob of around 25 persons descended on Junaid and his brothers, shouting, "Tum mulle ho, kattulle ho. Gai ka gosh khate ho" ("You are Muslims, circumcised. You eat cow meat").¹³ They were called Pakistanis, insulted with "communal slurs", stabbed incessantly and thrown off the coach. Junaid succumbed to his injuries.

While Junaid's death had not been the only one that involved a death related to mob violence over the last few years, it along with some other incidents drew extensive national attention. This well-deserved attention was not only because of the manner in which Junaid was murdered—by an angry and violent mob—but because the violence was blatantly directed against Junaid because of his religious identity. The incident may not have started because of religion-based motivations, but the circumstances and the utterances of the alleged perpetrators reflected that religious prejudice was imbricated in their motivations. Junaid was killed, at least in part, because his killers were motivated by prejudice and hostility towards his religious identity.

This is repeated in a series of cases, high profile and otherwise. A mob entered into a Muslim family's house, attacked its members and brutally killed one of them, after an announcement was made from a neighborhood temple that they had cow meat at home.¹⁴

A Muslim migrant worker was bludgeoned to death and his dead body set on fire, with all this being recorded on video, while his attacker blamed him for "love jihad" — a phrase used by the extremist members of Hindu right-wing organizations to refer to a conspiracy theory that Muslims are forcibly or fraudulently converting Hindu women on the pretext of marriage.¹⁵ A Christian man was attacked and his car set ablaze by a mob that claimed that he was conducting religious conversions.¹⁶ A group of boys forcibly entered into a Muslim family's house late at night, killed a couple and raped a woman and a minor girl; and before raping them exclaimed that they ate cow meat.¹⁷

This pattern of violence, whether described as lynching or mob violence, reflects precisely the element of violence targeting individuals, at least in part, because of their identity. This is also reflected in whatever data exists on these incidents. The yet to be released religious-hate crime data being recorded by Indiaspend.in's Hate Crime Watch observes that as many as 62% of the victims of religiously motivated hate crimes reported in English news media were Muslims. 13% were Christians, 10% were Hindus and the rest were unknown. Indiaspend.in's data on cow-related violence, which is also based on English news media reportage, shows that out of the 94 incidents since 2012, 55% victims were Muslims, 11% were low caste Dalits and 19% were unknown. Bias, prejudice and hostility towards the religious (or caste) identity of the victims is the most significant feature of these violent incidents, irrespective of the mode of violence or the 'reason' that may be associated with it.

The existence of bias motivation behind this violence is also the main reason why political actors, social figures and state actors have taken these incidents seriously. The reason why the contemporary pattern of mob violence or mob lynching has increasingly been seen as a crisis—for Indian society and the criminal justice system—is not because of the mode of violence but because it reflects deep social fissures. This is a pattern of violence that we can identify as hate crimes, viz. crimes that are partly or wholly motivated by the perceived or actual identity of the victims.¹⁸

The political and social urgency of mob violence, and the nature of crisis it reflects for our criminal justice system point us to the fact that the contemporary problem of mob violence is the problem of hate crimes. In *Tehseen Poonawala*, the Supreme Court did not frame its judgment solely around the conceptual boundaries of hate crimes. It used various terms, including targeted violence, lynching, mob violence, vigilantism and hate crimes, to describe the problem. Nevertheless, hate crimes, understood as bias or prejudice motivation, was an essential subtext and context of the judgment.

The urgency and need of collecting data should also be approached from this perspective. In its judgment, the Court mandated that the government collect data and identify hotspots of violence within three weeks of its order.

This reflects that the Court recognized that contemporary mob violence is not purely spontaneous, may be organized at various levels and requires a concerted and well-informed policy apparatus to address it. Crimes data is indispensable for this.

Hate crimes, of course, are not new in India. And they are not limited to religion-based hate crimes. Caste and gender-based violence have a long history in the country. But unlike hate crimes motivated by religion, race or ethnicity, caste and gender-based violence has been captured by crimes data collected and maintained by NCRB. Caste-based hate crimes are recorded under a separate proforma of the Scheduled Caste and Tribe Atrocities Act. Similarly, violence against women is also recorded under a separate proforma. But religion-based based violence is not specifically captured by NCRB.

To be sure, NCRB does collect data on communal riots and communally-motivated murders. The former category reflects a sub-categorization of riots, viz. violence caused by an unlawful assembly of 5 or more persons. NCRB asks the police personnel to supply their assessment of various motivations for murders, including communal and casteist.

But neither of these two categories adequately corresponds to what the Supreme Court's order mandates. Hate violence perpetrated by mobs may not result in death and the mobs may be smaller than 5 persons.

Collecting data on hate crimes serves an important policy purpose even beyond the judgment. Hate violence is often brutal and leaves deep psychological impact on the victims.¹⁹ As many scholars have noted, hate crimes are not only injurious to the health of the criminal justice system, but also produce grave social consequences. They weaken social bonds and cohesion, and alienate marginalized minorities and reduce their trust in the system.²⁰ As other scholars have noted, hate crimes go beyond the direct victims in terms of causing harm. Since the identity of the victim is imbricated in the crime, they generate threat and vulnerability for larger communities.²¹ For this reason, the Supreme Court recognized the social and political costs of mob violence and lynching. It noted that these acts of violence created a hostile environment against communities and threatened the social fabric of the country. "Hate crimes," the Court held, "as a product of intolerance, ideological dominance and prejudice ought not to be tolerated." Each of these produces important imperatives for the criminal justice system to keep track of hate crimes.

Additionally, as I will point out further below in terms of the challenges of calling hate crime data, the experience across countries is that victims are most reluctant to report hate crimes to the police. This is in part the result of the fact that it is mostly the members of marginalized and subordinated groups that are subjected to hate crimes. These groups tend to have worse relations with the police and other institutions of the criminal justice system. They are not only more likely to feel that reporting hate crimes is pointless, but also have a genuine reason to fear both indifference and animosity from the police. In light of these harms of hate crimes and the obstacles for the criminal justice system to respond to them fully, it becomes even more important to maintain unimpeachable data on them.

To summarize, while the contemporary crisis of violence has been described through diverse phraseology, the basis of the social, political and institutional attention is the existence of bias motivation.

It is not the mode of violence, but violence being partly or wholly motivated by prejudice and bias that makes these incidents particularly gruesome so as to invite special attention of our criminal justice institutions. Hence, what is at stake is the category of hate crimes. There is a need to collect data on this category because it is mandated by the Supreme Court's guidelines. Moreover, the nature and gravity of the harms caused by these kinds of incidents creates another imperative rigorously maintaining data.

III. Hate Crimes, not Mob Lynching or Violence

The first problem with adopting the categories of "mob violence" or "mob lynching" is obvious: there is no precise definition of either of these phrases. These terms do not have a presence under any of the Indian penal laws; nor is there any transnational legal policy practice that lends any definitional clarity to them.

In *Tehseen Poonawala*, the Supreme Court defined lynching in broad terms, as "targeted violence and commission of offences affecting the human body and against private and public property by mobs under the garb of self-assumed and self-appointed protectors of law."

This definition also reflected the strong 'rule of law' strain in the judgment, where the Court came down heavily on mobs that "took law into their own hands." This definition of lynching speaks to a certain motivation on part of the alleged perpetrators, which is often found in the American legal and legislative history of laws against lynching. For example, in the famous Dyer anti-lynching bill, the failed legislation that aimed to make lynching a federal offence in 1922, the prohibited "mob or riotous assemblage" was defined as "an assemblage composed of three or more persons acting in concert for the purpose of depriving any person of his life without authority of law as a punishment for or to prevent the commission of some actual or supposed public offense." NCRB has not adopted this definition for data collection.

The potential category of "mob violence" is equally if not more vague. It is not clear how mob violence is actually different from "rioting," which is defined as violence by an unlawful assembly of five or more persons.

The second problem with adopting these categories, in line with what I argued in the previous section, is that these categories do not capture the precise nature of the problem. Mob lynching, as extra-judicial violence, does not capture seminal cases like Junaid's, or numerous other cases where *Dalits* were beaten up for skinning dead cattle. In none of these cases is there any criminality that is, even on the surface, sought to be prevented or punished.²²

The category of mob violence is more evidently unhelpful. It appears to focus on the mode of violence and not the nature of motivation.

The problem of imprecision is magnified when placed in the context of the methodology that NCRB adopts in collecting its data. Firstly, NCRB routes its data through police personnel at the police station level. This is done through the data proforma that it circulates beforehand, followed by training sessions.

This data flows up from the station level to the district, state and national levels, where it is verified and compiled. Secondly, NCRB primarily collects data based on First Information Reports (FIRs). Here, it follows the 'Principal Offence Rule' – police personnel record the crime under the most heinous offence or serious criminal provision as reflected in the FIR. Consequently, while collecting data based on FIRs reduces the police discretion in data recording, it intimately links data to ordinary policing. In other words, if the police in ordinary course is not filing FIRs or not filing them under certain criminal provisions, the same disparity will be reflected in the data as well. Interestingly, the converse of this also occurs and creates perverse incentives for the police. In India's public culture, higher crimes data is often perceived to reflect badly on the police. This is because in public discourse, higher crimes data is mistakenly interpreted to mean higher incidents of crimes – and hence faulty policing. Political pressures of maintaining an appearance of good policing often pushes the police to maintain low crimes numbers, and consequently also low number of recorded police cases. In other words, the incentives of keeping crimes data low overflow into the police often refusing to record, investigate and prosecute actual cases.²³

Thirdly, NCRB does collect data based on motivations. As mentioned above, NCRB records various motivations for murders and homicides. But these motivations are recorded by the police personnel themselves. While NCRB does claim to conduct training sessions, it is not clear to what extent these training sessions focus on definitions and the creation of standards across police stations.

Each of these potential limitations makes any proposal to collect data under the categories of “mob violence” or “lynching” insurmountably challenging. Since these categories do not represent criminal offences, their determination will be subject to police discretion. It is not clear if adequately sharp definitions along with rigorous orientation have been provided to the police personnel who will be recording these categories. It is also not clear if these categories will be adequately different from the existing categories like communal and caste riots.

IV. How to Collect Hate Crimes Data

The first available model of hate crimes data monitoring is one based out of the criminal justice system. Countries like the United States of America and the United Kingdom allocate the work of collecting hate crimes data to the police – something that the police personnel do in the normal course of their work. For example, in the United States, FBI has been given the authority and mandate to collect hate crimes data from local law enforcement agencies under the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 1990.²⁴ The rationale was that since hate crimes were not wholly new crimes, but only existing crimes with bias motivation, the law enforcement agencies would be in a good place to collect data in the ordinary course. Consequently, hate crime data collection under this system is prone to under-reporting. Moreover, hate crime data collection is not mandatory and law enforcement agencies are free to participate if they want. Hence, there is less possibility of comprehensive data.

Some of the issues with the American model are addressed meaningfully in the model that has been adopted in the United Kingdom. UK does not have separate hate crimes legislation, but has a cluster of penalty enhancing laws in case of bias motivation. For example, the Criminal Justice Act mandates enhanced punishments in the cases the criminal act was partly or wholly motivated by hostility towards victim's membership in specified groups.²⁵ This legislative infrastructure does not mandate collection of hate crimes data. This is done by the police force itself under a matrix of guidelines and procedures.

Under these established practices, the police is required to record all “hate incidents”, whether or not they amount of an actual crime or whether or not there is evidence of bias motivation, that have been reported to it by the victims. In England and Wales, the police force—specifically the various enforcement authorities under the criminal justice system like the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the National Offender Management Service and other agencies—agreed to a common definition of hate incidents and hate crimes in 2007. According to this definition, “[a]ny incident, which may or may not constitute a criminal offence, which is perceived by the victim or any other person as being motivated by prejudice or hate.”²⁶ Hence, the focus is on collecting data in a very broad way and not only data related to criminally actionable evidence. Police officers have been provided with criminal data manuals, are expected to flag the category of bias motivations (for example, race, religion, sexual orientation among others), and in some cases are provided a detailed data form.²⁷

The design adopted in the United Kingdom, despite housed inside the criminal justice system, manages to escape some of its most jarring limitation. Firstly, the focus is on collecting as much information as possible by not definitionally linking data collection to the police's assessment of legally viable evidence. Secondly, the police also relies on non-state entities to supply it with hate crimes information, some of which is incorporated in official data.²⁸ Thirdly, data collected by

the police is supplemented by anonymous victimization surveys.³⁰ Victimization surveys are also used in other jurisdictions like the United States,³¹ providing a well-trained data collection scheme. A remarkable feature is that the police forces treat a rise in hate crime numbers as, in part, a desirable outcome: they recognize that citizens are less likely to report hate crimes and a rise in numbers reflects a more effective hate crimes monitoring mechanisms.³²

The model adopted by the UK appears to be useful for India, since the latter does not have a specific hate crime legislation, unless of course gender and caste legislations are classified as such. Rather than pushing the police personnel to collect data based on their assessment of motivation, it is more appropriate to ask them to collect data along multiple categories like: hate incident (reported by victim or others), hate crime (that fits the police's assessment of motivation), type of bias motivation (caste, religion, region, language, sexual orientation, race, sex, ethnicity among others) and context.

The second model is to separate hate crimes monitoring altogether from the criminal justice system. The advantage of this model of separating crimes data collection from the other institutions of the criminal justice system are immense, most of all for the category of hate crimes.

When data-collection mechanisms are contingent on the ordinary course of the criminal justice system, the irregularities, discrepancies and biases of the latter are bound to flow into the former. For example, since the police regularly refuse to register FIRs and women find it hard and are often reluctant to report cases,³³ the NCRB data on crimes against women will remain in the realm of uncertainty.³⁴ The same goes for all the other hate crimes, including those based on religion and caste. For this reason, many scholars have recommended either replacing the existing system or supplementing it with more rigorous data collection devices like victimisation surveys.³⁵

But, of course, there are costs to this. While random sampled victimization surveys will generate the most extensive data on hate crimes, these will require a lot of expenditure. FBI had considered this method of collecting hate crimes data—“on a sampling basis, a nationwide, in-depth analysis of suspected bias-motivated incidents”—till it rejected it for being too expensive.³⁶

The problem with the current state of policy is a complete lack of discussion along these possibilities. Since both these models have their own advantages and disadvantages, particularly in the form of rigor and cost, this choice requires a conversation among various stake-holders.

In lieu of this, the most attractive model is a combination of the two alternatives. This would require NCRB to supply a separate data proforma on hate crimes to the police. The proforma should be able to record bias motivation reported by the victim or anyone related to them, sans any additional assessment by the police. Alongside this category of hate incident, the police should be asked to record their assessment on motivation under the category of hate crimes, followed by type of bias motivation and context. The operationalization of this would require extensive training modules by NCRB. Effort must also be made to education both the police and the public at large that higher hate incident and hate crime numbers are not necessarily undesirable, since they may very well reflect greater comfort of the victims to report such incidents. Besides this, focused and random-sampled victimization surveys must be adopted to illuminate under-reporting.

This model also offers a way out from the entrenched spiral that deceptively keeps criminal cases and data low. As I point out above, the reason for this spiral is that the perverse incentives of keeping prosecution and data numbers low feed into each other. Since the police often apply their “discretion” to not file FIRs under certain provisions, it pushes crimes data low. And since there is a political incentive to keep crimes data low, it incentivizes them not to file FIRs. This spiral is the result of crimes data and crimes prosecution being directly linked with each other. By asking the police to record data on hate incidents—that is not a “legal” category and does not demand the police to apply its discretion to access criminally actionable evidence—this model provides a window to at least record all those cases that the victims report as being bias motivated.

Of course, this does not resolve the larger problem of victims and survivors not reporting cases at all. To some extent, the issue of low reporting can be assessed through regular and extensive victimization surveys.

Another method, as adopting in UK, is to also officially recognize hate incidents reported to the police by non-governmental organizations who work among excluded communities. Nevertheless, this is a problem that cannot be resolved at the level of designing a data monitoring system. There is a larger need to generate confidence among victims, including conducting sensitization among state officials and media campaigns against hate violence.

V. Conclusion

My aim in this paper was to make a preliminary claim about the desirability of adopting a hate crimes framework for collecting crimes data in India. This framework is essential if we are to truly understand the nature of the contemporary crisis of mob violence, lynching and vigilantism in India. But adopting this framework does not fit neatly with the existing data collection practices in India. These practices have suffered from systemic problems, which further magnify the problems of precision and relevance of data categories in the case of mob lynching.

The choice for data collection need not be steep. I have tried to show that it is possible to maintain continuity of institutional data-collection practices while incorporating the soul of the hate crimes framework. This can happen if data reflects the victims' account of the existence of bias motivation, along with the nature of bias motivations, contexts and police's assessment. If done along with extensive training and regular victimization surveys, this model would be a good start to collecting pertinent and rigorous hate crimes data.

End Notes

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24. The Act provides that the US Attorney General should collect data on crimes "that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropriate, the crimes of murder, non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault; simple assault; intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of property." The FBI's existing Uniform Crime Report Program was delegated this responsibility.
25. See Section 145, Criminal Justice Act 2003. See also Sections 29-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; Parts III and 3A of the Public Order Act.
26. "Hate Crime Operational Guidance" (United Kingdom, College of Policing, May 2014), 34, <http://www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Support/Equality/Documents/Hate-Crime-Operational-Guidance.pdf>.
27. For the relevant documents, see "'Hate Motivation Definitions" (United Kingdom, Police Service of Northern Ireland), accessed January 9, 2018, https://www.psn.police.uk/globalassets/inside-the-psni/our-statistics/hate-motivation-statistics/hate_motivation_definitions.pdf; "Hate Crime Operational Guidance"; "The National Standard for Incident Recording" (United Kingdom, National Policing Improvement Agency, 2011), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116658/count-nsir11.pdf; "Home Office Counting Rules for Recorded Crime" (United Kingdom, Home Office, 2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/710824/count-flags-may-2018.pdf; "Charging (The Directors Guidance) 2013, 5th Edition" (United Kingdom, Police Service of Northern Ireland, May 2013), <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/charging-directors-guidance-2013-fifth-edition-may-2013-revised-arrangements>.
28. "Hate Crime Recording and Data Collection Practice across the EU" (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018), 91, fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-hate-crime-recording_en.pdf.
29. "Hate Crime Recording and Data Collection Practice across the EU," 25.
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34. Krishnaswamy, Bail, and Kothari, "Urban-Rural Incidence of Rape in India: Myths and Social Science Evidence."
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About the O.P. Jindal Global University

O.P. Jindal Global University (JGU) is a non-profit global university established by the Government of Haryana and recognised by the University Grants Commission (UGC). JGU was established as a philanthropic initiative of its Founding Chancellor, Mr. Naveen Jindal in memory of his father, Mr. O.P. Jindal. JGU has been awarded the highest grade 'A' by the National Accreditation & Assessment Council (NAAC). JGU is one of the few universities in Asia that maintains a 1:13 faculty-student ratio and appoints faculty members from India and different parts of the world with outstanding academic qualifications and experience.

JGU is a research intensive university, which is deeply committed to its core institutional values of interdisciplinarity and innovative pedagogy; pluralism and rigorous scholarship; and globalism and international engagement. JGU has established eight schools: Jindal Global Law School (JGLS), Jindal Global Business School (JGBS), Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA), Jindal School of Government and Public Policy (JSGP), Jindal School of Liberal Arts & Humanities (JSLH), Jindal School of Journalism & Communication (JSJC), Jindal School of Art & Architecture (JSAA) and Jindal School of Banking & Finance (JSBF).

Editors and Conveners of the Law and Policy Research Group

Dr. Ashish Bharadwaj is an Associate Professor in Jindal Global Law School, and a founding editor of the *Law & Policy Brief*. He serves as Director of Jindal Initiative on Research in IP & Competition (JIRICO) at O.P. Jindal Global University, a visiting professor at Institute of Innovation Research in Tokyo, and an affiliated faculty of CIPR, Maurer School of Law in Indiana University Bloomington. He holds a B.A. (Hons.) and M.Sc. in economics from Delhi University and Madras School of Economics, LL.M. in law and economics from Rotterdam, Hamburg and Manchester, and Ph.D. from the Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition in Munich.

Sannoy Das is an Assistant Professor at Jindal Global Law School. He holds a B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) from National Law University, Jodhpur and read his masters¹ in law from Harvard Law School. He researches on questions of law and history, international trade, political economy and political theory. Prior to joining the academy, he practiced law at the High Court at Calcutta. At the law school, apart from teaching courses on civil litigation, international trade and interdisciplinary electives, he also co-ordinates moot court activities.