

Strategies for Creating Insurgencies and Civil Wars in Europe: From Violent Extremism to Paramilitary Conflicts?

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The article assesses the role of violent acts committed by extremist forces in Europe. Through an understanding of contemporary social, ideological and political background it analyses selected strategies of insurgencies and civil wars that will remain an important element of Europe's future security development. Islamist strategies and responses to left wing West European political and military power are described. From the perspective of extremist forces, the author concludes with a vision of Europe deeply dissected into extreme left and right wing politics of control underscored with threats of violence.

INTRODUCTION

Various extremist forces exist in contemporary Europe which seeks to achieve their goals by violent means or plan violent acts for the future. Some of them strive to spark wider insurgency activities or civil wars. This can be traced both from the conceptual strategic materials created within the extremist environment and from the current trends in the extremists' activities. The aim of this article is to analyse selected strategies of insurgencies and civil wars planned for future deployment on the European continent. The conclusion will also describe a form of war that would occur if the crisis scenario of security development were to take place that is if the present extremist strategies were put into practice.

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FRAMING OF THE STRATEGIES AND PLANS FOR FUTURE EUROPEAN INSURGENCIES AND CIVIL WARS

Social problems and cleavages in contemporary Europe give rise both to impressions of a decline of the old continent¹ and, among those political currents which are currently at the margins of the political spectrum, to hopes of gaining power. Socio-economic development, immigration, demography and related security issues are among the fundamental factors affecting political events. Responding to these factors are authors of strategies, the intention of which is to transform the social circumstances in Europe by violent means, whether by insurgency or civil war.

These strategies appear especially among the extremists as they reject contemporary conceptions of the democratic constitutional state.² It must be emphasised that the military dimension of achieving goals is not usually dominant in these strategies. Rather, the strategies employ political procedures in their various forms and can often be ranked among wider political strategies³ of non-state entities. Having said that, elements of geo-strategy, grand strategy and partial military strategies do appear in these documents, or can be deduced from the extremists' existing expressions, as well as from models of their previous behaviour. Propaganda and plans for armed struggle are often emphasised in these strategies. We can therefore submit them to traditional strategy analysis and examine in particular the following dimensions:

1. The "grand strategy", meaning ideas about geopolitical arrangements in Europe and the role of the continent;
2. The insurgency and civil war strategy, meaning procedures intended to achieve goals by means of insurgencies and civil wars;
3. The tactical and operational activities, meaning concrete acts; the concept of "theater strategies"⁴ can likewise be adapted to the domain of insurgencies and civil wars.

1 See Rana Foroohar, *The End of Europe*, Time, August 22, 2011, 20-25.

2 Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse, *Vergleichende Extremismusforschung* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlag 2005), 9.

3 Joachim Raschke and Ralf Tils, "Ausgangspunkte der Analyse politischer Strategie" in *Strategie in der Politikwissenschaft. Konturen eines neuen Forschungsfelds*, ed. Joachim Raschke and Ralf Tils (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2010), 11-18.

4 John M. Collins, *Military Strategy. Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives* (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey, 2002), 4.

As the title of this article indicates, the focus here will be mainly on the second category. The framework for analysis will be derived from the work of Ariel Merari, who determined the following main strategies of insurgency: coup d'état, revolution, guerrilla, riot, terrorism and non-violent resistance;⁵ it also draws on the types of war elaborated by Paul Brooker.⁶ The article also respects new approaches to the so-called new wars⁷ and will endeavour to show that in the future the differences between the individual types will probably fade away. Nevertheless, a blend of old and new prejudices, threats and forms of conflict must be expected in future Europe.

The distinction between state and non-state actors will fade away in situations where extremists will be attempting to take control of the armed forces and will attempt to employ them to establish new regimes. If the global economic crisis is to continue, anti-state attitudes and movements will strengthen (indeed, their importance is already increasing today),⁸ and voices would probably appear demanding a new type of statehood, one that would overcome the Westphalian system and the present integration process in Europe.

The relationships towards European integration and the European level of politics are important elements in some strategies. In the past, strategies were worked out for the national level or assumed expansion in the European geopolitical space; today, they also respond to existing European supranational structures. With many extremist strategies, especially *jihadism*, the global dimension and the subordination of the situation in Europe to global strategic considerations, including animosity to the West in general, cannot be ignored.⁹

But the strategic thinking of both individuals and groups is also conditioned by contemporary events in the various parts of Europe and the world, and generally also by the traditions and cultural-political environments in which the strategies appear. Understandably, ethnic-regional extremists are strongly linked to their traditional territories and their political cultures,

5 Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 5 (1993): 213-251.

6 Table 2: Types of War (stateless warfare italicised) by Paul Brooker: Source: Paul Brooker, *Modern Stateless Warfare* (London, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 45.

7 For example Jacob Mundy, "Deconstructing civil wars: Beyond the new wars debate", *Security Dialogue*, 42 (2011): 279—95.

8 Patrick Dunleavy, "The Backlash against the State", *Political Insight*, 1/2 (2008): 4-6.

9 Walid Phares, *Future Jihad. Terrorist Strategies against the West* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

even if these cultures undergo processes of transformation. One of the factors in these transformations is immigration from non-European countries. Materials originating from other extremist environments in Western, Southern, Northern or Eastern Europe, but also from elsewhere, equally respond to specific domestic issues and these then also determine the European consequences of their strategies. One example of this is the so-called Breivik manifesto, which applies its author's Norwegian experience to the whole of Europe.¹⁰ Reflections on the Europe-wide implications of some events and analyses of their consequences for the future strategy of movements also appear, and here the Greek revolt can serve as an example.¹¹

In analysing the strategies of the various extremist ideological currents described here, one must begin with the documents which play an important role on the extremist scene and are popularised therein. It is difficult to determine their exact importance, however. There is no such thing as “the main strategic concept of jihadism” or of “European right-wing extremism”, if only because of the internal divisions within these extremist currents.

In this article I have chosen documents which are disseminated via important communication channels and information points within the scene, or are popularised in the discussions of virtual extremist communities. Their European import is also dependent on the strength of the structures within which the documents are shared and on whether they were popularised in the mainstream mass media or not.

ISLAMIST STRATEGIES

Islamist strategies against Europe are grounded in global plans to increase Islamist power, combining Islamist activities both without and within the European territory. Exact plans are not documented; rather, they must be inferred from materials focusing on specific issues, by extrapolating from the developmental trends hitherto, and also from analyses carried out by experts on these issues. Islamist thinkers such as Abu Ubayd al-

10 Andrew Berwick, *2083 – A European Declaration of Independence* (London: De Laude Novae Militae 2011).

11 Antonis Vradis and Dimitris Dalakoglou, “Introduction”, in *Revolt and Crisis in Greece. Between A Present Yet To Pass And A Future Still To Come*, ed. Dimitris Dalakoglou and Antonis Vradis, (Oakland, Baltimore, Edinburgh, London & Athens: AK Press & Occupied London 2011), 13-25.

Qarshi, Abu Bakr Naji and others have created detailed grand strategies for obtaining power in the traditional Islamic space, detailing steps to be taken against the West generally,¹² but not specifically against Europe. (This statement reflects known facts, but the possibility that such secret documents might exist obviously cannot be ruled out.) In analysing issues of Islamism one must bear in mind the heterogeneity of this phenomenon, both in confessional (Sunni and Shia groups) and ethnic/regional terms, something which also has a bearing on Muslim populations and on the diasporas in Europe.

Naturally, Europe is a heterogeneous whole, even if the final goal of the Islamists in the long term might be, at least for the Sunnis, the creation of a European caliphate. From the actions of Islamists so far, one can infer that they have strategies for three distinct areas in Europe (classified according to presence of Muslim population and strategic importance). These areas are Western Europe, the Balkans, and post-communist Europe, with Russia playing a specific role in the last due to connections with the Caucasus region and the Islamism therein. (In this article, Caucasus is not understood to be part of Europe.)

In Western Europe (this term essentially covers the EU as it stood before the Eastern Enlargement), Islamist are mainly active in immigrant diasporas. Some Islamists employ a legalistic strategy and could potentially transition to various forms of violence which will be analysed below. Jihadists, by contrast, prefer immediate action, mainly terrorist in character, both inside and outside the European territory (they are usually trained outside Europe). The war against global terrorism is for them a challenge to which they respond by waging a war that would as its goal establish a global caliphate.¹³

Petter Nesser's analysis shows that at the outset, Europe served primarily as a support base for regional jihadist activities outside its territory, then gradually also became an area of classic jihadist operations (such as the actions of Armed Islamic Group [GIA] in 1990s France which were connected with the situation in Algeria), and finally has also become a target of global jihadist attacks.¹⁴

12 Jarret M. Brachman, *Global Jihadism. Theory and Practice* (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 79-103.

13 Berndt Georg Thamm, *Terrorziel Deutschland. Strategien der Angreifer, Szenarien der Abwehr* (Rotbuch Verlag: Berlin, 2011), 116.

14 Petter Nesser, "Ideologies of Jihad in Europe", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23 (2011): 173-200.

The main goal of the important jihadist terrorist attacks in Europe thus far has been to dissuade the European states from engagement alongside the USA in the struggle against global jihadism, specifically, to deter these countries from “out of area” military operations in regions where Islamist guerrillas operate (Iraq, Afghanistan). This was true of the 2004 attacks in Madrid, the 2005 attacks in London as well as of the majority of attacks that had been planned in Germany. In Afghanistan, a unit of German Taliban Mujahideen (DTM) was formed of German Muslims, including converts, and plays a strong propaganda role in intimidating Germany. According to the jihadists, the aim is to bring Bundeswehr’s activities in Afghanistan to an end.¹⁵

To some degree, jihadist terrorists have also focused on those who are insulting Islam in Western Europe. A prominent case concerned the caricatures of Prophet Muhammad published in a Danish newspaper, with papers that reprinted them also constituting a target. Such was the rationale given for attempted attacks on the publishers and authors¹⁶ of the caricatures, and in attacks on civilians that were planned in 2007 by the so-called Sauerland Group (cells of Islamic Jihad Union, IJU) in Germany.¹⁷ The protests against the Danish caricatures certainly cannot be reduced to jihadist terrorist acts, however.

In Europe, but also elsewhere in the world, reactions to the cartoons have developed into organised violent protests, the aim of which was to test the extent to which European countries are able and willing to defend their concept of freedom. This is connected with the legalist strategy of the Islamists, who seek gradually to use anti-discrimination norms to become unassailable, and to criticise any negatives pointed out in connection with Muslims. This strategy complies with Islamists’s targets as previously set: to expand the space of their own power, to obtain the possibility of applying Sharia law, and to construct autonomous spaces serving as bases for expansion. To achieve these goals, temporary allies from the ranks of European multi-cultural activists can be employed. Riots appearing in other contexts can also be used to strengthen the Islamist influence, as was the case of the riots in French suburbs in 2005.

15 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2009* (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern 2010), 246.

16 Europol, *TE-SAT 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (Den Hague: Europol 2011), 15, accessed 20 December 2011, www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/te-sat2011.pdf.

17 Friedrich Steinhäuser, *Terrorziel Europa* (Wien: Edition A 2011), p. 106.

There are two other strains of violent strategies that need to be monitored in Western Europe. First, terrorism by tiny groups and lone-wolf terrorism, or individual jihad, promoted by, among others, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri in the 6th issue of the magazine *Inspire* (2011).¹⁸ Second, the efforts to construct an effective base for establishing Islamist power in Europe. Permanent terrorism, even if carried out by individuals and tiny groups, can mobilise, by way of “propaganda by action”, a wider share of the Muslim generations growing up,¹⁹ which would subsequently focus on more effective forms of struggle.

Deployment of WMDs by Islamist terrorists on the European continent cannot be ruled out; it has been a subject of speculation since the 1990s and is expected by certain predictions.²⁰ However, the deployment of WMDs would only make sense if they were intended to deter the European population and its governments from involvement in the Muslim world, or if a mass conflict were to erupt in Europe. And one must differentiate between potential deployments of radiological “dirty bombs” and nuclear weapons, as the effect of the former would be more psychological than the latter.

To strengthen its positions in Western Europe, Islamism is more likely to make use of demographic development, which is favourable to it (the so-called population bomb), and of gradual expansion from Muslim neighbourhoods and regions which will co-operate with Islamists outside Western Europe. Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein, who has interviewed

18 Al-Suri talks about the following: “The failure of the operational methods of the secret, hierarchical organizations, in light of the international security campaign and the {sic} international and regional [counter-terrorism] co-ordination {...}. Furthermore, the need for an operational method, which makes it impossible for those security agencies to abort the Resistance cells by arresting [some of] their members, based on [information extracted through] torture and interrogation [of other members].” He also talks about the necessity of “{s}preading the ideology of the Resistance, its program, its legal and political bases, and its operational theories, so that they are available for the Islamic ummah’s youth who strongly wish to participate in the jihad and Resistance... Instructing the youth in the armed operational method, in building the cells of the Resistance units as a ‘system of action’ (*nizam al-‘amal*) and not as ‘a secret organization for action’ (*tandhim lil-‘amal*) {...} Coordinating a method in which all efforts are joined, in order to combine their result in a mechanism which confuses the enemy, exhausts him and heightens the spirit of the Islamic Nation so that it joins the Resistance Phenomenon.” Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, “The Jihadi Experiences. Conditions for Resistance to use Individual Jihad”, *Inspire* 6 (2011): 15. [Translator’s note: Square bracket interpolations appear in *Inspire*; my editorial additions appear in {}.]

19 Lorenzo Vidino, “Origins and Characteristics of Homegrown Jihadist Networks in Europe”, in *Europe and Transnational Terrorism. Assessing Threats and Countermeasures*, ed Franz Eder and Martin Senn (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2009), 35-58.

20 Gary Ackerman, “The Future of Jihadists and WMD”, in *Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction. “Trends and Emerging Threats”* ed.. Gary Ackerman, Jeremy Tamsett (Boca Raton, London, New York: CRC Press, 2009), 359-400.

al-Qaeda representatives (especially Abu Musab al-Zarqawi), said in 2005 that the organisation's strategy consists of several steps whose aim is to overthrow governments in the Arab world during the period 2010-2013 and to establish a caliphate there. This caliphate would then provoke a confrontation with the West.²¹

The events of the Arab Spring 2011 cannot, however, be considered a fulfilment of this strategy, as political forces of moderate Islam and Western aid both substantially contributed to these events. Jihadist forces have attempted to capitalise on the events for their propaganda, but have largely been unsuccessful. (This includes al-Qaeda; consider Osama bin Ladin's last message.)²² Rather, it is the non-militant Islamists who have taken power for now. Although protests spread across the Arab region, they have not been oriented towards establishing a transnational caliphate. If the new regimes were to be unsuccessful, however, transition to militant Islamism and its external expansion would be possible. In such a case a specific role in its creation would probably be played by the strongly Islamised Turkey, rather than Iran, as the latter is influential mainly among Shia networks, while the Sunni jihadists reject its influence.²³ Such militant Islamism would not necessarily threaten European countries with immediate military expansion (that could arrive at a later point), but rather by exerting pressure through the disruption of energy and raw material supplies²⁴ and blocking of trade routes. It would, however, likely gain support from the Muslim enclaves in Europe.

If the Islamists were to gain command over the growing Muslim communities in Europe and use them to control the territories inhabited

21 Yassin Musharbash, "What al-Qaeda Really Wants", *Spiegel Online*, August 12, 2005, accessed 20 December 2011, www.service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,369448,00.html

22 Osama bin Ladin said the following about the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt: "At that point, glory presented itself to the youth of Islam and their souls longed for the time of their grandfathers so they obtained it from the liberation square in Cairo torching it in order to overcome the tyrannical regimes. They stood up in the face of falsehood, upraised their fists against it, feared not its soldiers and entered into a covenant and indeed they preserved the covenant as determinations were firm, forearms were supportive and the revolution was promising. To those free revolutionaries in every land: hold fast to the reins of the first initiative, be cautious of dialogue since there is no meeting in the middle way between the people of truth and the people of deception; far be it from that and not at all!" Shayk Usama bin Ladin, "An Address to the Revolutionaries", *Inspire*, 6, (2011), 51-53.

23 Stratfor, *The Devolution of Jihadism. From Al-Qaeda to Wider Movement* (Austin, TX: Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2010), 167.

24 Walid Phares lists "economic jihad (oil as a weapon)" as one of six "tracks" which can be detected in the jihadist strategic approach globally; the others comprise "ideological jihad (intellectual penetration), political jihad (mollification of the public), intelligence jihad (infiltration of the country), subversive jihad (behind enemy lines and protected by its laws), diplomatic jihad (controlling foreign policy)". Walid Phares, *Future Jihad. Terrorist Strategies against the West* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005), 137.

by Muslims, they would probably attempt to incite riots, in co-operation with Islamists from the traditional Islamic space, in order to weaken the power of the European states. Foci of guerrilla resistance would probably gradually appear, and the zones controlled by Islamists would expand (tactical materials elaborated for contemporary insurgencies in the Arab space could also be employed to this end).²⁵ Infiltration of armies and security forces of the European states would also be important for the Islamists, as it would open the door towards paralysing these forces and converting them partially to the insurgents' side. Such aspects are not clearly defined or formulated in the available existing Islamist materials, however.

Likewise undefined is the role of the Muslim enclaves in the Balkans, which could be used as footholds for subversion in Europe, serving as transit spaces for arms smuggling, emergency escape routes for the jihadists, training areas, etc. In the next decade, substantial extremist Islamisation of the Balkan space is not probable, however, and the Muslim enclaves are relatively small (Bosnia, Sandžak, parts of the territory of the so-called Greater Albania). Although links between Islamists and jihadists with this space have their traditions²⁶ and fairly strong Islamist communities are active there (connected with networks in Western European diasporas), a strong counter-force is at work against this Islamisation, both from the secular and moderate forces in the Muslim population (this is the case of Kosovo) and from states in which these communities live (Serbian activities in Sandžak). In the event of risky developments these territories could be occupied by neighbouring countries and international forces, unless the insurgents were to receive Islamist help from outside. The Islamists therefore focus on establishing long-term positions in the Balkans²⁷. East-Central Europe is likely to play only a marginal strategic role, partially as a base and possibly as an occasional target of attack due to the pro-American and pro-Israeli stances of the government in this region.²⁸

25 Norman Cigar, *Al-Qa'da's Doctrine for Insurgency. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin's "A Practical Course for Guerilla War"* (Washington D. C.: Potomac Books 2009).

26 Evan F. Kohlmann, *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe. The Afghan-Bosnian Network* (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2004).

27 Vlado Azinović and Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber, *Assessing the potential for renewed ethnic violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Security risk analysis* (Sarajevo: Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo 2011), 173-176.

28 Miroslav Mareš, "Terrorism-Free Zone in East Central Europe? Strategic Environment, Risk Tendencies, and Causes of Limited Terrorist Activities in the Visegrad Group Countries", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23 (2011), 233-253.

Russia is also perceived as an enemy by the Islamists, at present primarily because of its engagement in the Caucasus. The main contemporary goal of the jihadists is to force Russia to leave this space, and to establish a Caucasus caliphate, something that is also manifest in the name of the umbrella terrorist organisation in the region. The regional identity of the Highlanders has become interwoven with global jihadism.²⁹

The long-term strategies of the struggle against Russia are not known, but they would probably correspond to that in Western Europe: employment of the “demographic weapon”, creation of enclaves and expansion out of these enclaves. In Russia, the attempt to establish such enclaves would from the outset trigger very harsh responses both from the state and from the extreme right. The Islamists therefore focus on gradual strengthening of their positions and would likely to strike if Russia were weakened (for instance, in the long-term perspective, during a hypothetical Sino-Russian conflict). But such goals are not clearly formulated in the known strategic documents and can only be deduced from the developments expected.

STRATEGIES OF THE EXTREME LEFT

The extreme left is characterised by its use of the classic works on revolutionary struggle (by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao Zedong, Che Guevara etc.), which they attempt to adapt to contemporary issues and apply to the realities of today’s world. The strategic goals are oriented towards establishing various forms of egalitarian society (communism or anarchism). To mobilise its sympathisers, the extreme left forces today use the global economic crisis as their main argument, attempting, in the spirit of their ideologies, to employ internationalist approaches. It is possible to speak of the European and global dimensions of these strategies,³⁰ which are nevertheless relatively undeveloped in terms of proposed violent and armed courses of action.

29 Emil Souleimanov and Tomáš Šmíd, “Islam and islamism in the Northern Caucasus: Problems, controversies, trends”, *Rexter*, 7 (2010): 19-40. accessed December 20 2011, www.rexter.cz/wp-content/issues/2010/01/rexter-2.pdf.

30 Some movements of minor importance have specific nationalist orientations, for example Russia’s National Bolshevik Party, which intends by means of partisan struggle to seize power in one of the post-Soviet countries with a strong Russian minority and to establish therein a paradigmatic national bolshevik state that would convince Russia’s population about the suitability of such a model. See Edvard Limonov, *Drugaiia Rossiia, Ocbertaniia Buduscbego* (Moskva: Ultra.Kultura., 2003).

A number of communist parties of various orientations are active on the European continent, from dogmatic Stalinists to reform entities. They are relevant in some party systems only (Greece, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, and the like).³¹ These parties sometimes do employ strong revolutionary rhetoric, but do not create efficient revolutionary structures and as a rule do not have plans to carry out the revolution other than those made by the classics of Marxism-Leninism. They do not have elaborate tactical procedures that would serve to obtain positions in the armed forces which was a condition for success for realising the Soviet revolution in 1917. In contrast to the period of the cold war, communists cannot rely on armed aid from without, because the Soviet Union ceased to exist and the contemporary communist regimes, China included, do not have the potential (and probably not even the willingness) to employ the European communists for effective subversion in any substantial manner (unless the situation were to change due to China's global expansion, interlinked with mobilisation of Chinese diasporas).

Although the anarchist spectrum produces various programmatic and strategic materials with war-evoking titles, such as *21st Century Class War*³² or *Beyond Resistance. A Revolutionary Manifesto for the Millenium* [sic]³³, these documents usually do not clarify how the goals set are to be achieved. "Class war" is usually elaborated tactically in terms of clashes in street demonstrations (this has also been true of the militants of the Black Bloc who have become a relatively stabilised "striking power" of the anti-globalisation movement)³⁴ and is then applied to the main enemies (transnational corporations, capitalist states, etc.). These are generally to be vanquished by pressure from the "street", i.e. a strong revolutionary protest movement. Partial transformation of the movement into a military organisation is not considered. In reality, activities of the Black Bloc regularly accompany important summits of world organisations, but they do not proceed beyond large-scale clashes with police forces and therefore do not have the character of a "militant vanguard" able to mobilise the wider movement; much less do they represent an issue in military perspective.

31 Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau, "Conclusion", in *Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe*, ed. Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2007), 535-607.

32 Anonymous writer, *21st Century Class War* (London: Class War Federation 1999).

33 Anonymous writer, *Beyond Resistance. A Revolutionary Manifesto for the Millennium* (Anarchist Communist Federation 1997).

34 Anonymous writer, "Black Bloc, A Primer", *Profane Existence*, 43 (2003): 7-10.

At the period when militant autonomous movement appeared in Western Europe in the 1970s, some of its strategic materials envisaged at least some contact with the army environment (including membership in cells of army officers who would secure these contacts). The purpose of these contacts was to strengthen the system of autonomously operating cells within the framework of the movement. This follows from the document “Organisation of Autonomous Cells” which was created in West Germany in 1970³⁵ and continues to be disseminated within the German autonomous movement. There is an intensive transfer of ideas from Germany to other countries with strong autonomous structures (Italy, where Autonomism emerged, Netherlands, and others).³⁶

ORGANISATION OF AUTONOMOUS CELLS




Figure 1

Source: Anonymous writer, *Die Organisation der autonomen Zellen* (Osnabrück: Packpaier Verlag, 1970), 11.

After the 1998 cessation of activities by the terrorist group Red Army Faction in Germany, a discussion unfolded on the pages of magazines of the extreme left scene as to how to continue with militant activities (the so-called Militanz-Debatte). Some of the participants in the debate preferred activities of stable collectives under one name; others ad hoc acts either without a name, or with different name for each action (the so-called “No-

³⁵ Anonymous writer, *Die Organisation der autonomen Zellen* (Osnabrück: Packpaier Verlag, 1970).

³⁶ Georgy Katsiaficas, *The Subversion of Politics. European Autonomous Social Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life* (Oakland, CA, K Press: 2006).

Name” Militanz).³⁷ This second concept has distanced the movement from the possibility of transforming into units organised in a military fashion.

In 2010, a form of free “socially rebellious banditism” was promoted on the pages of an influential magazine of the extreme left scene, “Radikal”. This banditism was to consist in car torching and similar acts; the extremists hoped to mobilise the masses in this manner. The concept was inspired by the 1920s ideas of the German communist Karl Plättner, hence it is sometimes called “Plättnerism”. After the defeat of paramilitary revolutionary communist formations, especially the Red Ruhr Army, Plättner rejected military organisation and promoted free “bands”.³⁸ The contemporary German militant scene focuses on sabotage attacks against “capitalist infrastructure”. An example of this was the action of the HEKLA collective against German railways in 2011, concomitant with the demand that German troops be withdrawn from Afghanistan. (According to the perpetrators of the attack, the railways are used for army transports.)³⁹ Neither the autonomous scene nor its terrorist offshoots have a detailed strategy for seizing power, however.

This is also manifest in actions of various terrorist groups in Greece which accompany the revolt there, or in Italy. The Greek revolt itself is inspiring for the extreme left mostly due to the ability of the Greek activists to systematically mobilise the masses and to organise mass protests, something that the extreme left fails to achieve elsewhere in Europe. The left extremists interpret the events in Greece both as an “insurrection”⁴⁰ and as an “insurgency”, as the 2011 statement of the Occupied London Collective makes clear, summarising at the same time the lessons to be learned from this revolt:

37 Miroslav Mareš, “Extreme Left Terrorism in Contemporary Europe: from ‘Communist Combatant Parties’ to Militant Campaigns?”, *Central European Political Science Review* 9 (2007): 294-314, accessed 20 December 2011, www.cepsr.com/dwnld/maresx20040404.pdf.

38 Einige aus der Ex-(MG), “Der Weg von der ‘Hassbreneierei’ zum organisierten Sozial-Rebelismus. Ein Nachtrag zur Militanzdebatte”, *Radikal*, 162 (2010): 9-18.

39 The full name of the organisation is “The Hekla reception committee – for more social eruptions” and is explained with reference to volcanoes: “Following the Icelandic volcanoes, that hopefully will make us very happy more often, slowing down the routine of economy from time to time. ‘Hekla’ is such a volcano – its eruption is long overdue.” Hekla, Presseerklärung zu den Brandanschlägen auf Bahn und Telekommunikation wegen 10 Jahre Afghanistan, *Indymedia*, October 10, 2011, accessed 20 December 2011, <http://linksunten.indymedia.org/de/node/48377>

40 Alex Trocchi, “For the insurrection to succeed, we must first destroy ourselves”, in *Revolt and Crisis in Greece. Between a Present Yet To Pass and a Future Still to Come*, ed. Antonis Vradis and Dimitris Dalakoglou (Oakland, Baltimore, London, Edinburgh & Athens: AK Press and Occupied London, 2011), 299-328.

The Greek experience in the time of the IMF so far has taught us a few bitter lessons. Lesson number one – a revolt does not happen by default. Just because “things are too difficult,” people won’t automatically become active. And if they do, it might be for the wrong reasons altogether. Lesson number two – when a revolt does happen, as in 2008, its legacy is precious. It gets inscribed in our spaces of the everyday, it livens up our practice and inspires us as a possible direction into which change may head. Lesson number three – the legacy of a unfinished revolt can also be a burden. It remains as a painful memory of change that came to halt; of the counter-insurgency launched by authority, of the limit inherent in some of our practices even, which can become a counter-insurgency force in itself – as the deaths of 5 May in Athens were sure to show.⁴¹

How the Greek revolt would be employed to actually seize the power is nonetheless not specified. Neither is the extreme left really able to make use of spontaneous riots of immigrants and the lumpenproletariat, for instance the 2005 riots in Parisian suburbs or the riots in English cities in 2011. Under the influence of the riots in the country, a document called “The Coming Insurrection” (*L’insurrection qui vient*) was composed within the French extreme left scene in 2007. It was later extended and published in a German edition in 2009. The stated author is the Invisible Committee,⁴² and the material is influential on the contemporary extreme left scene.

“The Coming Insurrection” demands the creation of autonomous communes which would have territories under their control and would be able to form units to defend themselves from the police. An armed insurrection is supposed to arise from the communes. The effect of the armed combat is expected to be political rather than otherwise: an act of propaganda. The authors state:

From a strategic point of view, indirect, asymmetrical action seems the most effective kind, the one best suited to our time: you don’t

41 Occupied London Collective, “Capitalism by Default”, in *Revolt and Crisis in Greece. Between a Present Yet To Pass and a Future Still to Come*, ed. Antonis Vradis and Dimitris Dalakoglou (Oakland, Baltimore, London, Edinburgh & Athens: AK Press and Occupied London 2011), 329-331.

42 Unsichtbares Komitee, *Der kommende Aufstand* (Hamburg: Edition Nautilus Verlag Lutz Schulenburg, 2010), 106.

attack an occupying army frontally. That said, the prospect of Iraq-style urban guerrilla warfare, dragging on with no possibility of taking the offensive, is more to be feared than to be desired. The militarization of civil war is the defeat of insurrection.⁴³

The document's authors also understand the arrival of an occupying army into the communes as an opportunity, as they believe that an army's presence in the streets is a sign of rash decision and a revolutionary situation. With 18 March 1871⁴⁴ as a model, this situation would lead to fraternising between the soldiers and the street. It is not impossible, they say, to defeat an army politically and to establish the system of communes.⁴⁵

This strategy of the extreme left depends on the appeal of the riots and on the communes disregarding class, race and allegiances to urban districts. Overcoming ethnic differences and involving immigrant communities into a thoroughly developed extreme left struggle has so far proven to be a rather utopian idea indeed. (The same is true of the plans to bring together the extreme left and the Romani in East-Central Europe.) The relation to Islamism is likewise unclear: while perceived as reactionary, Islamism is considered a potential ally who could be "re-educated". Interestingly, the initially unequivocal support for the events of the Arab Spring by the extreme left in 2011⁴⁶ has been later replaced by a reserved attitude, or even criticism of the new regimes being constituted by neo-liberals supported by NATO weapons.⁴⁷

STRATEGIES OF THE EXTREME RIGHT

In terms of declared belligerence on the European continent, the extreme right's strategies are more open and elaborate than others. One needs to bear in mind that these declarations arise mainly out of marginal dogmatic currents, especially the neo-Nazi subculture, or are the work of certain intellectuals, and are not endorsed by the strong right populist parties who attempt to become part of the European establishment. Especially in Eastern Europe, the extreme right popularises, among other things, concepts of traditional wars between states over disputed territories, and

43 Unsichtbares Komitee, *Der kommende Aufstand*, 106. [Translator's note: English version taken from www.tarnac9.wordpress.com/texts/the-coming-insurrection/, unpaginated, accessed 27 November 2011.]

44 The beginning of the Paris Commune.

45 Unsichtbares Komitee, *Der kommende Aufstand*, 107-109.

46 "Arab revolutions shake the world", *Permanent revolution*, 20 (Summer 2011), 39-47.

47 Jörg Kronauer, "Das Bagdad-Syndrom", *Konkret*, 10 (2011), 12-15.

does not intend to create trans-national structures (certainly not with their traditional nationalist rivals). Some Europe-wide strategic conceptions do exist, however.

On a general level, one of those who have spoken about inter-racial civil war has been the French extreme right ideologue Guillaume Faye. According to Faye, the preliminary stage of an inter-racial civil war has already been underway since the 1990s due to Islamisation and the crimes committed by immigrants. A true armed resistance of traditional European populations will appear, Faye says, either at the point when power in European states falls into the hands of the Muslim and Afro-Maghreb communities, or when the standards of living of the European nations decline substantially. (Faye literally stated: “There is no rebellion as long as the supermarket trolley remains full.”)⁴⁸

The concept of “Racial Holy War” which appeared in the racist Christian white scene in the USA is also being promoted on the European neo-Nazi scene,⁴⁹ however, without religious dimension⁵⁰. The various proclamations about racial war and resistance are usually not supported by detailed conceptualisations; rather, they consist in broadly expressed willingness to fight, and to commit genocide or deport enemies (in Western Europe, the enemies are Muslim and African immigrants; in East-Central and South-Eastern Europe, the Romani; in Eastern Europe, especially in Russia, immigrants from Caucasian and Central Asian countries).⁵¹

More elaborate strategies do appear, however. At the beginning of the 1990s, a document entitled “Werewolf” appeared among the German neo-Nazis and subsequently influenced the scene both in Germany and in other countries. The document envisaged the creation of a terrorist breeding ground, essentially along the lines of the extreme left Red Army Faction, called Werewolf, which would mobilise the masses and operate alongside political parties functioning legally. (Until the outbreak of the revolution, the two structures were not supposed to acknowledge each other publicly.) The conception of the organisation is expressed in the following schema:

48 Guillaume Faye, *Wofür wir kämpfen. Manifest des Europäischen Widerstandes* (Kassel: Ahnenrad der Moderne, 2006), 226.

49 Ben Klassen, *Rabova. This Planet is All Ours* (Creativity Book Publisher 1987), accessed 20 December 2011, www.creativitymovement.net/documents/RAHOWATH.PDF

50 Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorismus. Der unerklärte Krieg* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006), 361.

51 Martin Laryš and Miroslav Mareš, “Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Russian Federation”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63 (2011): 129-154.




Figure 2: Structure of the underground organisation

Source: Martin Bergen, “Die Verbreitung der Propagandamaterial am Beispiel der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei/Auslands- und Aufbauorganisation (NSDAP/AO),“ in *Aktuelle Aspekte des Rechtsextremismus. Internationale Erscheinungsformen und Zusammenhänge*, ed. Herbert Kloninger (Brühl/Rheinland: Fachhochschule des Bundes für öffentliche Verwaltung, 2004), 104.

Around this guerrilla organisation a revolutionary movement would gradually appear that would be able to seize power in a civil war. Opposition to rigid and hierarchical structures has also appeared on the neo-Nazi scene, and manifested itself in attempts to create free cells without clear leadership. This has been inspired by the concept of leaderless resistance created in the USA by Louis Beam in 1991 under the influence of works dating to the 1960s about strategies of US resistance in case of Soviet invasion of the country. Leaderless resistance has also influenced the originally elitist concept of Combat 18 (the numbers 1 and 8 denoting Adolf Hitler’s initials). No longer a closed British terrorist group of the 1990s, it has become something of a franchise that neo-Nazi militants of various “Aryan nations” can use to carry out various acts. With a few exceptions, however, Combat 18 is yet to surpass the level of propaganda.⁵²

52 Miroslav Mareš, *Terrorismus v ČR* (Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005), 192-193.

The conceptions of “Free Nationalism” developed in Germany in mid-1990s also draw on ideas of leaderless resistance. Independent neo-Nazi cells can also co-operate with other entities of the extreme right and together constitute the movement of National Resistance or Free Resistance.⁵³ This concept also expanded into other countries of both Western (for example, the groups of English National Resistance) and Eastern Europe and the movement is sometimes referred to as European National Resistance⁵⁴.

Under the pseudonym Andrew Berwick, Anders Breivik attempted to introduce new impetus into the debate on militantism within the extreme right scene with his 2011 manifesto “2083: A European Declaration of Independence”, which he popularised by his brutal terrorist acts. Breivik fights against so-called “Cultural Marxism”, which, according to him, allows immigration into Europe and in effect aids Europe’s Islamisation (he also blames globalized capitalism for immigration, however). Breivik professes nationalism and conservatism, which he understands in a non-democratic fashion. He rejects neo-Nazism and emphasises Europe’s Christian roots. He also supports Israel. He had himself photographed in a Masonic dress which met with displeasure among both neo-Nazis and dogmatic Catholics.

Breivik intends to initiate The European Resistance Movement/Indigenous Rights Movement, suggesting several phases of struggle whose goal would be the seizing of power in Europe by a conservative non-democratic group. He defines several groups of traitors who are to be annihilated.⁵⁵ His tract contains a “legal disclaimer” in which parts of the book are described as “fiction” in an attempt to be absolved of blame, which explains the wording of the following quote:

53 In the early 2000s subculturally-grounded Autonomous Nationalists appeared, using Free Nationalism as a point of departure. They have adopted the look and elements of propaganda of the extreme left. The Autonomous Nationalists seek to express themselves in cultural activism and street violence and do not endeavour to transform themselves into a military structure. See Petra Vejvodová, “Autonomní nacionalismus”, *Rexter* 5 (2008): 1-36, accessed December 20, 2011, www.rexter.cz/autonomni-nacionalismus/2008/11/01/.

54 Miroslav Mareš and Petra Vejvodová, “Transnacionální dimenze soudobého českého neonacismu”, *Mezinárodní vztahy*, 46 (2011): 75-90.

55 Table 3: System for classifying traitors according to Breivik:

This book[']s chapter 3 describes how a “fictional” resistance group is emerging and how it would operate from the so called “Phase 1 through Phase 3” in order to prevent these perceived threats and atrocities from futher [sic] manifesting and to prevent an alleged future Muslim takeover. It also describes specifically how this hypothetical fictional group, “PCCTS⁵⁶, Knights Templar”, would choose to respond towards the so called ”enablers” or the so called “cultural Marxist/multiculturalist” elites that are allegedly allowing millions of Muslims to enter Europe.⁵⁷

According to Breivik,

The PCCTS, Knights Templar serve as an independent pan-European Military and Criminal Tribunal in the current Western European civil war. We have come to the conclusion that the democratical struggle to save Europe has been lost. Our purpose and goal is to defeat the cultural Marxist/Multiculturalist Alliance of Europe, seize political and military control of Western European countries and implement a cultural conservative political agenda. PCCTS activities will continue in all three phases of the European civil war until our objectives have been completed.⁵⁸

Table 1: Phases of European civil war according to Breivik:

Phase 1	1999-2030	Cell based shock attacks, sabotage attacks etc.
Phase 2	2030-2070	Same as above but bigger cells/networks, armed militias
Phase 3	2070-2083	Contribution with the effectuation of the coup and responsibilities in relation to security and executions of category A and B traitors.

Source: Berwick 2011: 833.

56 Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici (PCCTS): Poor Fellow-Soldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon.

57 Berwick, 2083, 766.

58 Berwick, 2083, 822.

Table 2: Types of War by Paul Brooker:

	Against one or more bands	Against a semistate	Against a state
By a state	Counterinsurgency	Civil or expeller war	“Normal” inter-state war
By a semistate	Counterinsurgency	Civil war	Civil war or expeller war
By a band	<i>Inter-band conflict</i>	<i>Insurgency</i>	<i>Insurgency</i>

Source: Paul Brooker, *Modern Stateless Warfare* (London, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2010),45.

Breivik details the individual phases and provides a range of tactical procedure and advice on procuring weapons, especially for Phase 1. For Phase 2, he calls for “building a cultural conservative paramilitary/militia organisation”⁵⁹, into which individuals from the police/military would be recruited by means of propaganda.⁶⁰ These paramilitary groups would then fight, effect coups in certain European countries, and support similar groups in others. The wars would also involve the deployment of WMDs. After achieving victory, executions of traitors and deportations of Muslims would begin.⁶¹

Extreme right groups in Central and Eastern Europe, including the “White Media” group in the Czech Republic, also employ the concept of European war.⁶² In 2009, this group created a propaganda video “Europe 2029” in which it warns against the Islamisation of Europe. This group envisages that a Muslim state, supported by Islamists of Maghreb, will arise in southern France after a guerrilla struggle, and Muslim uprisings will gradually help Islamists to seize power in the UK, Germany and Scandinavia. In Italy and certain Central-European countries, such as Hungary and Poland, nationalists and fascists would eventually seize power, which would lead, in Italy, to deportations and in Hungary and

59 Berwick, 2083, 1280.

60 Berwick, 2083, 1283.

61 Berwick, 2083, 1301-1302.

62 In 2011, this group voiced support for A. Breivik’s act. See “Informace BIS o vývoji na extremistické scéně v 3. čtvrtletí roku 2011”, Bezpečnostní informační služba, accessed December 2, 2011, www.bis.cz/2011-3q-zprava-extremismus.html.

Poland, prevention of immigration. In other countries, nationalist militia would appear which would be forced to fight gangs of African immigrants and Muslims, who would join forces with “gypsy” inhabitants, according to the authors of the video.⁶³

Paramilitary extreme right units are already today active in some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, especially in Russia and Hungary. In Russia, paramilitary groups are strengthening their positions and are evidently confident that with the political support of the street they will be able to seize power. In Hungary, the extreme right party Jobbik counts on the paramilitary Hungarian Guard and its splinter units as a future police force. Hungarian paramilitary units are already used for vigilantism, especially against the Romani.

STRATEGIES OF ETHNIC AND REGIONAL EXTREMISM

Various ethnic and regional militant groups continue their activities in Europe and seek to achieve independence for their territories by terrorist methods (which in their propaganda are presented as guerrilla). These groups include, above all, those in Northern Ireland, Corsica, and the separatists on Spanish territories (ETA has declared a ceasefire, however). In terms of strategy, these groups are stagnating, and although sporadic attacks do occur (and target even military facilities),⁶⁴ their activities do not have substantial military and strategic prospects.

In South-Eastern Europe, small armed groups operate endeavouring to establish “Greater Albania” (the chief representative being the Albanian National Army, AKSh) and seek to replicate, albeit so far unsuccessfully, the pattern of transformation from a small clandestine organisation to a large guerrilla army provided by the Kosovo Liberation Army in the 1990s.⁶⁵ Elsewhere, ethnic and regional movements are irrelevant and therefore also uninteresting strategically.⁶⁶ (A possible exception to this

63 White Media. “*Europe 2029*” Youtube, January 23, 2010, accessed December 20, 2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=THrItK9cGo8.

64 Europol 2011, 22.

65 Věra Stojarová, *Současné bezpečnostní hrozby západního Balkánu. Kritická analýza konceptu bezpečnosti Kodaňské školy* (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2007), 104-109.

66 Although speculations appear about the possible emergence of a mass Romani militant movement in response to the racism of the majority, the speculations do not have clear outlines, either in terms of tactics and strategy of the struggle, or in terms of territorial demands. Options ranging from autonomous Romani areas (ghettos) not connected into a consistent whole, to earmarking a territory for a Romani state, could be envisaged.

could be branches of Hungarian extreme right organisations abroad on territories inhabited by Hungarian minorities, if these organisations were to expand in the future.)⁶⁷

Table 3: System for classifying traitors according to Breivik:

Category	Characteristics	Punishment
Category A	Political leaders (NGO leaders included) - Media leaders (chief editors) - Cultural leaders - Industry	Death penalty and expropriation of property/funds
Category B	Category B traitors are cultural Marxist/multiculturalist politicians, primarily from the alliance of European political parties known as "the MA 100" (parties who support multiculturalism) and EU parliamentarians. Category B traitors can also be individuals from various professional groups (but not limited to): journalists, editors, teachers, lecturers, university professors, various school/university board members, publicists, radio commentators, writers of fiction, cartoonists, and artists/celebrities etc. They can also be individuals from other professional groups such as: technicians, scientists, doctors and even Church leaders. In addition, individuals (investors etc) who have directly or indirectly funded related activities.	Death penalty and expropriation of property/funds. Punishment can be reduced under certain circumstances.
Category C	Category C traitors are less influential and lower priority targets (often individuals who have facilitated category A and B traitors)	Fines, incarceration, expropriation (considered as acceptable indirect casualties in larger operations where WMDs are involved).
Category D individuals	Category D individuals have little or no political influence but are facilitating category B and C traitors and/or MA100 political parties/media companies through various means.	

Source: Berwick 2011, pp. 930-931

⁶⁷ Věra Stojarová et al, *Security Perspectives of the Western Balkan Countries* (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2010), 47.

Interestingly, some ethnic terrorist formations have partially changed their orientation, focusing now on immigrants to their territories and pursuing vigilantist activities. This is not an entirely new phenomenon, as already in the 1980s, for instance, ETA attacked Castilians coming into the Basque country,⁶⁸ but at the time these were Spanish inhabitants. Today, the attacks are targeting immigrants coming from outside the European space (or the Romani)⁶⁹ and therefore have to be understood in the context of the above-mentioned concepts of “European civil racial war”.⁷⁰

A specific approach, similar to the “strategy of tension” employed by Italian neo-fascism in the 1960s and the 1970s, was invented in the first half of the 2000s by a neo-Nazi group of Flemish separatists who called themselves Blood, Soil, Honour and Loyalty (BBET). One of the plans of the group, which counted members of the Belgian army among its ranks, was to murder the Flemish extreme right politician Filip Dewinter under the “false flag” of Islamist terrorists and subsequently, under a different banner, the Lebanese-Belgian politician Dyab Abou Jahjah (president of the Arab European League – AEL).⁷¹ The strategy was to incite a racial and religious war which would result in an independent, and ethnically pure, Flemish state.

The so-called new minorities in Europe thus far do not have their own strategies for asserting their armed interests on the European continent. An exception to this is the logistical and sometimes violent support provided to the territories where the minorities originated (this is typical of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eealam).⁷² Plans for the military use of diasporas for armed politics to the benefit of the immigrants’ countries of origin are not known. (An example of such a strategy could involve the Chinese diaspora in a hypothetical clash between Europe and China.)

68 Raphael Zariski, “Ethnic Extremism among Ethnoterritorial Minorities in Western Europe. Dimension, Causes, and Institutional Responses”, *Comparative Politics* 21 (1989): 256.

69 For example the attacks of Northern Ireland loyalists against Romani from Romania in 2009. See Marie Breen-Smyth, “Racism and violence in Northern Ireland: Romanian Roma driven out of Belfast”, *e-International Relations*, July 1, 2009, accessed January 24, 2012. www.e-ir.info/?p=1764.

70 Although Basque, Northern Ireland republican and Corsican terrorists declare a certain leftist identity, if the traditional character of their territories is perceived as under threat, this identity can give way to an attempt to secure “ethnic purity”.

71 Khaled Diab, “Neo-nazism is Europe’s hidden terrorist menace”, *The Guardian*, 11 July 2010, accessed 20 December 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/11/islam-white-racist-terror-attack.

72 Astrid Bötticher and Miroslav Mareš, *Extremismus: Theorien – Konzepte – Formen* (München: Oldenbourg Verlag 2012), 350.

CONCLUSION: WHAT SORT OF EUROPEAN CIVIL WAR IS ENVISAGED BY THE EXTREMISTS?

The strategic materials analysed and trends expected allow us to deduce the basic character of the European civil war as envisaged by contemporary extremists. It must again be pointed out, however, that with the exception of Breivik's manifesto, concepts presented are very vague. If they are elaborated in more detail, they concern either the tactical level of terrorist activities (individual Jihad, Werewolf, and the like) which are to initiate a wider movement, or complex political goals ("caliphate", "communist society", etc.).

Islamists endeavour to establish an Islamist territory in Europe and count European adversaries of Islam as their enemies. Members of the extreme left aim to ferment anti-capitalist struggle in which they would also involve the immigrants. The extreme right plans a fight against "racial enemies" (non-Aryan immigrants, Romani, etc.) and political opponents (multi-culturalists, the left, etc.). It can be assumed that one of the warring sides would be constituted by Islamists, supplemented at least partially by the extreme left, while the other would consist of the extreme right and some ethnic and regional extremists.

In reality, tendencies towards lone-wolf terrorism and employment of the concept of leaderless resistance are more apparent. In order for a war-like conflict to break out (and this encompasses even the new conceptions of war), a transformation of these actors from free cells to other organisational forms would be necessary. In a European civil war, the conflict would occur, at least at the outset, between non-state paramilitary groups combining elements of terrorist fighting, vigilantism and propagandist offensive. These groups would fight each other and concurrently attempt to create autonomous territorial units upon which the state power could exert no influence. Should the state power refuse to accept this, the groups would have to fight this power as well. Both the extreme right and the extreme left would attempt to win the soldiers deployed against them to their side (and would have had networks of sympathisers in place in the army for this purpose), hoping that the army would gradually join their side (and help carry out the coups, among other things). In all probability, the Islamists presently do not count on making use of parts of the European armies, at least nothing that would indicate this follows from the known materials.

Given the increasingly multi-cultural character⁷³ of the armies, the partial increase of tension in the armies⁷⁴ and instances of hate incidents among the soldiers,⁷⁵ such a possibility cannot be completely ruled out for the future, however.

Autonomous territories would then gradually unite, continuing to fight against both non-state and state enemies. Paramilitary units would gradually transform themselves into regular armies. Some right extremists in Eastern Europe believe that Western European states will collapse under the pressure of the Islamists within and Eastern Europe will have to be defended against an Islamist offensive from Western Europe. Both the Islamists and the extreme left would establish dictatorships on the territories captured, with Islamists initiating a harsh Islamisation, while both sides would organise deportations, genocide and the politicide of their enemies.

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73 Arno Tausch, "Multikulturalität und die Armee der Zukunft in Europa – ein erster Datenbefund basierend auf dem World Values Survey" und dem "European Social Survey" *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift Online*, 201 (2009): 13-20, accessed January 24, 2012, www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/omz/oemz2009_05.pdf.

74 For example in the French army. See Catherine Wihtol de Wenden and Christophe Bertossi, *Les militaires français issus de l'immigration* (Paris: Centre d'études en sciences sociales de la défense, 2005), accessed Jan. 24, 2012, ww.c2sd.sga.defense.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/WENDEN_militaires_francais_immigration_2005.pdf.

75 The Austrian daily *Kronen Zeitung*, for instance, reported an anonymous letter describing regular conflicts between Muslim and non-Muslim soldiers over cleaning chores. See Claus Pándi, "Profile Pointen", *Kronen Zeitung*, September 22, 2010, 2-3.

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