New Opening to The Old Gateway: Chabahar Seaport and The Economic and Strategic Benefits to The Region

Saber Salem*

Abstract

The signing of the Chabahar Port Deal between India, Iran and Afghanistan is literally living up to its name, Chabahar which means four springs -char-four bahar- springs in Persian. It has led to budding of new hope of regional economic prosperity, peace and greater friendship and cultural ties. The Chabahar port in southeastern Iran will open a gateway from the warm waters of Oman Sea leading to the Indian Ocean and the landlocked countries of Afghanistan and Central Asia. It will pave the way for India to conduct trans–national trade and commerce with the regional countries as well as beyond.

India, an emerging economic powerhouse, will have direct access to the natural resources of the region which means wider market accessibility for the region as a whole and economic prosperity. The port will also allow India to bypass Pakistan’s volatile territory, currently, the only limited overland route between India and Afghanistan through which Afghan truckers are allowed to carry their goods to the Attari–Wagah border but are de–barred from carrying Indian products through Pakistan. Chabahar will also enable India to counter China’s growing presence in the Arabian Sea. China has invested US $46 billion in the Pakistani port of Gwadar. Given that both China and Pakistan have territorial disputes with India, it makes sense for India to take pre-emptive measures and strengthen its maritime power in the region proportionately.

For the landlocked Central Asian region the deal means wider market accessibility for their natural resources and produce as well as a chance to be an equal partner in globalization. Culturally, the port deal will connect the peoples of the region showcasing their distinct features, cuisines, customs and traditions, norms and values and an opportunity to learn from others.

Saber Salem is a Doctorate Research Fellow with the Jindal School of International Affairs. He has worked for donor and humanitarian organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for many years. He holds a BA degree in Politics and International Relations from the Manchester Metropolitan University, UK and an MSA in International Development from the Andrews University, USA.
It also means a better shot at regional security with greater understanding and agreements.

This appears on the surface to be a win-win situation but will it all be plain sailing? Herein comes the significance of regional geo-politics that has the potential to rock the boat if not to scupper the deal altogether. Intricate diplomatic choreographing is needed if this deal and the hopes of the region are to bear fruit.

INTRODUCTION

India’s interest in the development of Chabahar port in south–east Iran goes back to the 1990’s, finally coming to fruition with the signing of an agreement on 24th of May 2016. India and Iran have agreed to develop Chabahar, located in the Gulf of Oman northwest of the Indian Ocean, into a full-fledged deep seaport. The agreement to develop Chahbahar has generated enthusiasm and stoked interest because it is not only Iran and India that are the major stakeholders, but Afghanistan as well. This tripartite agreement involves development of major road and rail connectivity between the three countries in order to link them up to the seaport. This has implications for wider accessibility to the Central Asian countries and beyond. For landlocked, resource-rich Afghanistan and Central Asia, this accessibility to the sea and a resurgent Indian economy offers tremendous economic potential for the region—that was thus far constrained by Pakistan’s veto of the only land route connectivity between India and Central Asia.

Nascent steps in developing alternative trade routes via Iran were first initiated when a deal was inked by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2003 but it could not materialize due to sanctions imposed on Iran in light of its nuclear program. The lifting of the sanctions meant the go-ahead for the vital warm-water seaport, which will connect India with the lucrative Iranian, Afghan and Central Asian markets. India intends to build a 500 km rail link between Chabahar and Zahedan, the capital of Sistan-Baluchistan province. On the Afghan side, India has already built the 218 km two-lane highway from Delaram in Farah province to Zaranj in Nimruz province bordering Iran. This will directly link the port to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Afghan government has welcomed the implementation of the project and hopes to use the harbor to drive economic development.

India has committed itself to investing US $500 million in the initial phase to construct a container and a multi-purpose cargo terminal and
increase its capacity up to six million tons (Times of India, 2016). State owned company, Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC) in a recent statement reported in the *Hindustan Times* this year, said that India plans to invest up to US $20 billion in the development of the port and has requested its Iranian counterpart to allocate adequate land in the Chabahar Special Economic Zone (SEZ). Indian companies such as Indian Ports Global Pvt Ltd (IPGPL) and Kandla port will install the equipment to develop two berths, operate them for ten years before handing over the equipment to Iran (The Indian Express 2016).

The construction of Chabahar Port will benefit India and Iran; open up trade routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia; and will also open transnational trade and commerce with other nations in the region. Moreover, it will allow India to bypass Pakistan’s volatile territory for trade with Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics. In addition, India will also use the port deal as a framework for further political, diplomatic, cultural and regional cooperation and integration. Arijit Paladhi opines “The deal in many ways is also a natural progression of India’s long-standing relationship with Iran” (2015). So, is this grand vision of re-opening the old Silk Route on the part of India?

Today, India does not have overland trade and commerce with resource-rich Central Asia. New Delhi hopes that development of Chabahar port apart from boosting bilateral trade and commerce with these countries will also build confidence for investment. Today bilateral trade between India and Iran is slightly over US $4 billion while between India-Afghanistan it “has stagnated in the range of $680 million in the last two fiscal years” (Laskar, 2016). India aims to boost its bilateral trade with Iran by up to US $30 billion by the end of 2016 and far beyond the current figure with Afghanistan in subsequent years (Shankar, 2016).

The only foreseeable challenge to the deal is Pakistan, whose relentless support for terrorism and extremism could cause some hiccups in the project. Islamabad “…perceives the Chabahar project as a challenge to its efforts to develop the Gwadar port in Balochistan with Chinese assistance” (Laskar, 2016). Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan and India’s relation have descended into internecine wars and prolonged periods of avowed mistrust. Pakistan has been harboring terrorist groups and using them against India and Afghanistan to achieve its foreign policy goals. This has hampered India’s influence in and ties to the region. However, despite Pakistan’s hostility and attempts to undermine the Indian role in the region have met with little success given India’s deep historical links and convergence of geo-political interests with key regional players.
THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE CHABAHAR DEAL

India sees both political and economic benefits in developing the Chabahar seaport. On the economic front, the port will allow India to directly tap into Afghan and Central Asian markets by circumventing the volatile Pakistani territory. Pakistan has denied India overland trading rights with Afghanistan through its territory (Behuria and Rizvi, 2015) by restricting the movement of Indian goods to Afghanistan. The Af-Pak Trade and Transit Agreement allows Afghan trucks to carry cargo to Pakistani ports but the trucks are not allowed to transport Indian goods through Pakistan to Afghanistan. Therefore, Chabahar’s development is expected to reduce costs by almost a third and increase the potential transaction value of trade between India, Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Afghanistan’s geo–strategic location provides it the unique ability to provide access to South, Central and West Asia. “Bypassing Pakistan’s hold on access to Afghanistan, India’s geo-strategic sway will be further enhanced” (Paladhi, 2015). By investing in the Chabahar seaport, India will secure multiple benefits: cultural, economic, political, maritime and geo-strategic. Indian companies will access many untapped markets in Afghanistan and wider Central Asia. India’s current bilateral trade with Afghanistan, for instance, is a mere US $680 million while bilateral trade, according to IMF statistics, between Afghanistan and Pakistan is over US $ 2 billion. Consider in this context the fact that “Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan has increased substantially, from $0. 83 billion in [fiscal year 2006] to $2.1 billion in [fiscal year 2013]” (Husain and Elahi, 2015, p. 2).

Drawing attention to India’s plan to construct a 560-mile long railway line linking the Iranian port with the iron ore mines in Hajigak Shankar (2016) argues this is linked to a larger geo–political and economic strategy. Indian companies have committed to an investment of over US $11 billion to extract iron–ore from Hajigak mines in Afghanistan (Mohanty, 2012). Indian investment in and development of the port will allow these companies to transport their raw materials from Afghanistan to India for processing at much-reduced costs and circumvent the volatile tribal areas of Pakistan. Additionally Afghanistan offers a vast reserve of untapped metals and minerals. According to the US Geological Survey, Afghanistan possesses huge gold and copper reserves of around 60 million tones, in addition to 2.2 billion tones of iron ore and 1.4 million tones of rare earth elements as well as untapped oil and gas reserves (Risen, 2010). This gives Afghanistan a unique opportunity to become the hub of economic activity in the region. Afghanistan needs capital and partners to invest in its untapped minerals. Opening up of this trade line could be a window
of opportunity for Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asian Republics to encourage foreign investors.

Like Afghanistan, Iran is rich in various natural resources. Indian companies have already started eyeing Iran’s iron ore, crude oil, gas, urea, sugar, rice and dry fruits, which were not tapped to their potential owing to sanctions. The other benefit that India will get from building and modernizing Chabahar port is reduction in import cost of oil and India’s investment in a fertilizer plant in Iran that could potentially save 50% of fertilizer subsidy (Sil, 2015). This is expected to address India’s long-term food security.

**STRATEGIC INTEREST AND GLOBALIZATION**

Besides its economic benefits, India will gain politically. Chabahar Port, is Iran’s only port with access to the Indian ocean will be a counter to the Gwadar port of Pakistan. India, as well as other interested countries, were always wary of Pakistan’s monopoly with respect to seaport connectivity. This uneasiness had been further exacerbated with China recently inking a deal with Pakistan to modernize and improve the Gwadar Port, a backdoor to India, in order to expand bilateral trade and commerce with the host country. During his two-day visit to Pakistan in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged US $46 billion infrastructure investment in Pakistan’s Gwadar port (Paladhi, 2015).

However, given China’s expansionist quest, the port could be used for military purposes, which will be deemed a threat to India’s own security and strategic interests in the wider Persian Gulf area. China Harbour Engineering Company, with the Port of Singapore Authority as a minority partner, have joined hands to develop Gwadar Port located 70 kilometers east of Chabahar and 1626 kilometers from the port of Mumbai. It is seemingly to facilitate bilateral trade and commerce between the two countries. However, military experts doubt China’s future intention, which would be to use the port for its armed maritime activities (Gupta, 2016). India, therefore, is taking pre-emptive measures to bolster its military standing in the region and protect its shipping and trading routes in the Arabian Sea. Thus Chabahar’s development is all the more critical to counter the ubiquitous Chinese influence. It will allow India to station its “security vessels for merchant ships off the coast of Africa as well as access to the Middle East and Gulf countries increasing trade and ties” (The Indian Express, 2015). The port, by virtue of its strategic location, will also underpin India’s presence in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, which are important trading routes and energy imports. Traditional big powers such as the United States of America and Russia as well as emerging powers
such as India will be better off militarily and economically if they maintain a strong foothold in the Gulf waters.

But Chabahar will not just fulfill India’s regional ambitions. The port deal will be a game-changer by strengthening India’s global reach. As Gilpin (1987) argues, “the Bretton Woods system of trade liberation, stable currencies, and expanding global economic interdependence no longer exists” (p. 3). In other words, the era of global North dominating global South is a bygone phenomenon. Today we are living in an era of globalization, which is a historical process of “widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness” (Mcgrew, 2008, p. 15). Since the end of the Second World War, the scale and scope of global interconnectedness has become widespread encompassing the economy, culture, bilateral trade and commerce. Global economic integration has taken the same expansion pace as global trade and commerce. This global interconnectedness between nations have increased the volume of trans-national trade and expanded national economies immeasurably.

Events of the late twentieth century and the fast pace of globalization have transformed the political economy of the world and international relations of states. As a result, the two fields of economics and politics have become intertwined with state politics revolving around economics and long-term trans-border interests. Gilpin (1987) argues the “parallel existence and mutual interaction of state and market in the modern world create political economy; without both state and market there could be no political economy” (p. 205).

The Second World War marked the downfall of fascism and colonialism and the rise of a new world order that embraced ‘institutionalization of world politics’, ‘globalization of world markets’ and ‘Americanization of world cultures’ (Mcgrew, 2008). The end of colonialism also shaped “aspiration of newly independent countries about their economic development and national sovereignty” (Nayyar, 2002, p. 3). Because of the emergence of these new phenomena, states, arguably, refrain from using hard power as much as their soft power to form economic and political alliances with each other. Creation of global institutions such as the United Nations (UN) in the wake of World War II and adoption of international laws impose restrictions on deployment of hard power, which is use of military force against another state. Instead, soft power is used through foreign aid and foreign direct investments.

India is but following this dictum by promoting exchange of ideas, health, education, technology, art, music, cinema, yoga and other aspects of
its culture with Iran and Central Asia to foster a mutual understanding. “Cultural Diplomacy is recognised as an important instrument of foreign policy in promoting international links among peoples and countries. In the past, there was an intrinsic link between culture and commerce” (Sahai, 2013). Cultural diplomacy also encourages foreign enterprises to invest in the economy, society, and people of the country they are exposed to. In today’s age of globalization, many businesses conduct trans-border business deals and maintain friendly connections with foreign counterparts. Without appropriate cultural knowledge, businesses, by and large, will have marginal chances of success. Today there is no overland trade and commerce between India and the Central Asian Republics. Chabahar will pave the way for these countries to revive their ancient bilateral trade and commerce. No business investment is as profitable and enduring as an investment in the people of a friendly nation. India has realized this fact and is, therefore, aggressively investing in this somewhat neglected enterprise.

**SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION**

The other factor that explains India’s investment in Chabahar Seaport is south-south cooperation. In the past, development aid would flow from global north to the global south because the latter was considered to be poor and did not possess the necessary financial and technical resources to fund development projects on their own. However, after decades of economic boom in the global south, especially towards the end of the twentieth and beginning of 21st century these countries are becoming financially and technologically self-sufficient. Today, most developing countries such as India have taken the initiative to provide technical and financial support to other developing countries in the global south, which would otherwise not be able to develop on their own. This new development referred to as south-south cooperation is a “broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains” (UNDP, 2015).

The phenomenon of south-south cooperation is a product of the UN conference in Nairobi, Kenya during the 1970s to create a framework for developing countries to help each other on technical and economic issues. This framework allows developing countries to “share knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to meet their development goals through concerted efforts” (UNDP, 2015). Recent developments in south-south cooperation have taken the form of increased volume of bilateral trade, foreign direct investment, movements towards regional integration, technology transfers, sharing of solutions and experts, and other forms
of exchanges. There is also a new form of collaboration where traditional donor countries and multilateral organizations facilitate south-south initiatives through the “provision of funding, training, and management and technological systems as well as other forms of support is referred to as triangular cooperation” (UNDP, 2015).

Following the emergence of new economic powers from the global south such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa, they have started playing a pro-active role in international political economy. It is evident that south-south cooperation is gathering pace and in the present climate as Purushothaman (2014) puts it, “International aid configuration reflects shifting structural dynamics in the international development architecture”.

REGIONAL COOPERATION OR SELF-INTEREST AND DOMINATION

There have been debates and counter debates about the nature of Indian investment and involvement in Chabahar in particular, and the Persian Gulf maritime zone in general. Broadly the debates can be classified under two camps. The pessimist camp argues that India is an emerging regional power and wants to spread its sphere of influence and is after wealth maximization and absolute gains. Hence, the host countries sustain far greater losses than relative gains. The optimist camp, on the other hand, argues that Indian investment in the port is to build a path towards more regional cooperation and integration. If we analyze the matter from the realist prism, which is the pessimist camp, it argues that states are always after their self-interest and power maximization even if it is at the cost of other states. The international system is anarchic and there is no supreme power in the international arena to correct state behavior. This anarchic nature of international system where there is no overarching central authority above the individual collection of sovereign states, makes state survival a priority. Realists also believe that ‘international politics, like all politics is a struggle for power’. State quest for power is an important component of realist lexicon. Like the pursuit of power, realists argue national interest is an “iron law of necessity” (Schmidt and Dunne, 2008, p. 92). Security dilemma, when one state starts building its military power disproportionately, realist argue, is a direct threat to the security of the other. Hence, states should not depend on other states or institutions to ensure their security.

Liberals, on the other hand, who subscribe to the optimist camp, do not look at the international system and relations among states through a pessimistic lens. For liberals the notion of community and the process of
interdependence are important elements. They believe that as the transnational trade and commerce increase and there are cultural contacts between peoples, governments and communities there is a corresponding increase in levels of interconnectedness and interdependence. As a result, it becomes more difficult and more costly for states to act unilaterally or to avoid cooperation with neighbors. Liberals argue that cooperation can happen when states have mutual and common interests. It will become excessively costly for states to go to war since cooperation will allow states to maximize their absolute gains. Liberals also believe in international institutions and regimes as the sole arbiter of international law. They argue that these institutions have legal authority to punish violators and free riders. As a result, the fear from international institutions increases cooperation and diminishes confrontation among states.

The case of the Indian investment and presence in Chabahar embodies both elements. Chabahar enjoys a strategic position in the region. Chinese investment in Gwadar port is seen by India as further cementing Beijing’s alliance with Pakistan and it challenges India’s power posturing in the region. Therefore, it makes sense for India to think realistically and boost its power by investing in Chabahar and find markets for its products. India is faced with a security dilemma since China, with help from Pakistan, is going the extra mile to bolster its maritime presence in the region. Hence, India has to neutralize this perceived threat by finding alternative sources.

From the liberalist perspective India wants to create an economic zone where all participating countries would conduct bilateral trade in a peaceful manner. It will also allow these nations to share knowledge, cultural traditions and create a common understanding among different peoples. Today terrorism and extremism have become a major challenge to peace, security and stability of the region as a whole. Investment in Chabahar will open windows of opportunity in working towards eliminating this crippling phenomenon. Moreover, liberals also argue that economic cooperation and regional interconnectedness makes it impossible for states to go to war and avoid trans-border tensions. Therefore, Indian presence in Chabahar region will create an alliance of countries and consortium of business companies with the sole purpose of doing business with each other, which will ultimately result in absolute gains for all.

Therefore, Indian investment in Chabahar will not result in Indian domination or absolutism. It will be more of a joint effort and cooperation, which is welcomed by all the participating nations. The deal would not have come to fruition had it been perceived as a threat or violation of sovereignty of any participating country. In addition, heavy involvement
of Indian investors and labor mobilization could transform the cultural set up of the Central Asian countries. In contrast the opposing argument believes that cultural globalization is spreading like wildfire facilitated by the fast-paced advancement of information technology and unprecedented scale of transnational travel. The tide of aculturalization is impossible to stem. Take for example France, which has been unsuccessfully trying to curtail cultural globalization for many years by investing billions of dollars (Mcgrew, 2008). Instead, French travellers and holidaymakers have been a strong boost in the overall transformation of the so-called ‘French cultural set up’. Therefore, it can be argued the increase in volume of Indian investment and bilateral trade with Central Asia is not perceived to be a threat to its ‘ancient’ or ‘pure’ culture.

**CHALLENGES AHEAD**

The opportunities notwithstanding there are an equal number of challenges that could overturn the deal all together. Firstly, the lifting of nuclear-related US sanctions on Iran is conditional. The US and its allies are monitoring Iran’s behavior closely. If Iran fails to abide by those conditions, western sanctions could be once again reinforced. Given that India’s relations with the US have been improving steadily in recent years, India will not risk hampering its relations with US over Iran, should the US re-apply those crippling sanctions on Iran. In such a scenario, Chabahar deal could be stalled-yet again.

Secondly, India has close economic, diplomatic and defense ties with Israel, a state Iran refuses to recognise. Israel is one of the biggest investors in India with over US $1billion of investment in 2000 (Kumaraswamy, 2009). Both countries are working to increase their bilateral trade as well as tourism industry far beyond the current levels. Defense collaboration, which most Indian policy makers believe led to the normalization of relations between the two countries, has grown markedly over the years.

Similarly, India’s enjoys close ties with Saudi Arabia, which is its largest crude oil supplier amounting for one-fifth of its crude oil imports and is India’s fourth largest trading partner with bilateral trade reaching US $40 billion (Gulf News, March 2016). The two countries are already party to the Riyadh Declaration, a strategic partnership signed in 2010 with a view to a ‘deeper engagement’ in political, economic, security and defence arenas. (ibid.) Given the history of the Saudi–Iran schismatic relationship, it could scupper the Chabahar port deal. India’s relations with these two important partners will require complex and intricate diplomatic choreography in the global ballroom.
However, the real challenge to the deal is Indo-Pakistan regional hostility. Since the 1947 partition of the Indian sub-continent, Pakistan has fought multiples wars with India over Kashmir. Ever since its humiliating defeat in the 1971 war, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan has also indulged in sponsoring terrorist groups to fight against India. The turbulent partition and the resulting subsequent bloodbath have left an enduring wound behind. Jha and Shukla (2012) argue the “division of territories and the migration of people from one side to another, accompanied by communal violence, generated a trust deficit, which both the countries have not been able to bridge so far” (p. 162). Despite multiple pacts and agreements that India has signed with Pakistan in a bid to end the entrenched hostilities, the Pakistani Army, which thrives upon escalating tensions against India, has played spoiler in all those agreements by choosing the path of violence by attacking India and its interests through homegrown proxies. It is worth highlighting that in Pakistan there the civilian government is overshadowed by the powerful military, which dominates state institutions and sets the country’s foreign and security policy.

The two ruling bodies i.e. the civilian administration and the military, have their own headquarters with the former stationed in Islamabad while the latter is in Rawalpindi. The army does not favor a strong civilian government and has made sure that the successive civilian governments are subservient to the military. Historically, the chances of survival of a strong civilian government in Pakistan have been quite slim. The army has resorted to staging a coup and overthrowing it, with the leaders either arbitrarily hanged, imprisoned or forcibly exiled. The country has witnessed many coups by Pakistan’s military since the country’s inception.

An insightful commentary on Pakistan’s policies towards its neighbourhood is Pentagon’s 2015 report titled “Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, which “condemns Pakistan for its use of terrorist proxies against India” (Panda, 2016). In August 2014, Indian Prime Minister Modi on a visit to Kashmir also stated that Pakistan “has lost the strength to fight a conventional war, but continues to engage in the proxy war of terrorism” (The Economic Times, 2014). In the past the Pakistan army has used the conflict in Kashmir in order to appropriate a big chunk of the taxpayer’s money to the military to sustain their lavish life-style. However, following the US invasion of Afghanistan and deposing of the Pakistani-client regime of Taliban from power, India joined the international community in the nation building process of Afghanistan. Today, the Pakistani army uses Indian presence in Afghanistan as an existential threat to its national
security. As a result, the ISI-funded and directed Haqqani network car-
bombed Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009 causing mayhem and
killing civilian population as well as high ranking Indian diplomats (New
York Times, 2008). Not to mention that the same ISI-nurtured terrorist
entity attacked Indian consulates in Herat in May 2014, Jalalabad in August
2013 and Mazar-e-Sharif in January 2016 (Hindustan Times, 2016; Al
Jazeera, 2016).

Bearing the flurry of ISI-funded terrorist activities against Indian interests
in Afghanistan, implementation of Chabahar project becomes immensely
challenging given that Pakistan, with China’s help, is developing Gwadar
seaport and has the same grand objectives. China and Pakistan's aim to tap
into Afghanistan as well as the Central Asian markets and wish to have
an upper hand in the region by curtailing India. Politically, Pakistan views
Afghanistan as its ‘strategic depth’ due to its geo–strategic location and
desires to have either a puppet or a rather weak government in Kabul with
no major ties to India. Economically, Afghanistan is its biggest source of
cheap raw materials and sole market for its poor quality goods. Most of
Afghanistan’s raw materials are processed in Pakistan and “the finished
goods are frequently resold to Afghans at a higher price” (Institute for the
Study of War, 2016). Today, global demand for raw materials is soaring
and “raw materials of all kinds are increasingly dear” (Zakaria, 2008, p.
28). Hence, Pakistan sees the development of Chabahar as an alternative-
trading outpost as a threat to its political and economic interests in
Afghanistan as well as in wider Central Asian region.

At a recent gathering hosted by a think tank in Islamabad, two retired
Pakistani generals, both former defense ministers, stated that the tripartite
deal on building the trade hub at Chabahar is a direct threat to Pakistan’s
security. They pointed out that the “alliance between India, Afghanistan
and Iran is a security threat to Pakistan and Pakistan is falling into an abyss
of isolation” (The Economic Times, 2016). The only option left for the
Pakistani army to derail the project is resorting to terrorism. They will use
their proxies such the Taliban and Haqqani network to unleash waves of
roadside bombs, burning commercial trucks and hostage taking with an
aim to dissuade truckers to ply on the Zaranj-Delaram road to Chabahar.
Thus, security of the road and keeping of terrorist elements at bay will be
one the biggest challenges for the deal to succeed.

Given that Chabahar seaport will bring economic prosperity not only to
the participating countries but the region as a whole, India must join hands
with Afghanistan and deploy a strong military contingent to keep the road
safe and secure – similar to the earlier deployment that India did to provide
security for the Indian road engineers working on the Zaranj– Delaram road. Needless to say, Pakistan-sponsored terrorism must stop. India must convince the US and the rest of the international community to exert necessary diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to stop sponsoring terrorism. If diplomatic channels fail to convince Pakistan to give up supporting terrorism, India must use its international clout to encourage the US to cut all forms of military aid to Pakistan. If none of these measures produce any tangible results, India, as a form of protest, must expel Pakistan from SAARC. Afghanistan, on the other hand, should cut its bilateral trade with Pakistan similar to the recent decision by the Afghan government to increase tariffs on Pakistani wheat flour. This decision has affected Pakistani mills substantially (The Express Tribune, 2015). The Pakistani government has hurriedly sent a delegation comprising businessmen and flourmill owners to ask the Afghan government to ‘clear the way for bilateral trade’ to Afghanistan (The Express Tribune, 2015). Such harsh measures will certainly force Pakistan to renounce sponsoring terrorism and abide by the international law and UN Charter.

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