Globalisation and Uncivil Society

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The article examines conflict and terrorism in the age of globalisation. Through a range of terrorist events in South-Asia and in the Middle-East, the article evidences, explores and questions progress of global society, inviting the reader to rethink human rights, and, in particular, the framing of responsibilities that are essential to their contemporary protection. It engages with the ideas of political risks, perpetration and victimisation through terror networks and flawed governance. Considering numerous cases of Islamist terrorist attacks on India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Sri Lankan LTTE and the Nepalese Maoists, it narrates that conflicts in the age of globalisation are an outcome of socio-political processes which lie in the interface between the local and the global. Accordingly, it reasons why the dynamics of globalisation is about inclusion as well as exclusion, and argues that states and non-states should work together to overcome the dark side of globalisation.

The conflicts of our time are fought by networked social actors aiming to reach their constituencies and larger audiences through the decisive switch to multimedia communications networks (Manuel Castells, 2009).

INTRODUCTION

A convenient dating point for marking the transition from one epoch to other remains 1945, for three reasons: the end of the Second World War; the establishment of the United Nations as a universal organisation to maintain international peace and security protect human rights and promote human welfare and development; and the inauguration of the atomic age. Today’s global environment is vastly more challenging, complex and demanding than the world of 1945. Just consider the vocabulary and...

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metaphors of the new age, every one of which would have mystified the 1945 generation: Srebrenica, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, Darfur; child solders, ethnic cleansing, blood diamonds, 9/11, regime change, HIV/AIDS, global warming; Microsoft, Google, iPod, Blackberry, Facebook, Twitter, You Tube.

All of them symbolise, as well as result from, the age of globalisation. Moreover, they all empower both the forces for good and the forces of evil. One of the most influential “global public intellectuals” is the award winning New York Times columnist Tom Friedman. He may not possess the scholarly accoutrements of an Ivy Leaguer nor exhibit the deep learning and scholarship of an Oxbridge professor. He more than makes up for that with a genius for capturing in bumper-sticker metaphors many important changes driving human history. Thus in The Lexus and the Olive Tree (Friedman, 1999), he explained how the human drive for enrichment (symbolised by the aspiration to own the luxury Lexus car made by Toyota) confronts the equally powerful human need for locally-rooted identity and community (symbolised by the olive tree). Risk-taking nations and individuals alike can exploit the limitless opportunity of globalisation to seek material advancement and prosperity but, if they are not careful, they could risk destruction of both cultural heterogeneity and environmental diversity.

In The World Is Flat (Friedman, 2005), he argued that the relentless onward march of globalisation had progressively lowered all sorts of barriers to the movement of goods, services, peoples and ideas across territorial borders (hence the flatness of the world) in an increasingly connected world. In a recent column, Friedman quotes Mohamed El-Erian: “The world is on a journey to an unstable destination, through unfamiliar territory, on an uneven road and, critically, having already used its spare tire.” Agreeing with this metaphor, Friedman extends it even farther: “Nations are more tightly integrated than ever before. We’re driving bumper to bumper with every other major economy today, so misbehaviour or mistakes anywhere can cause a global pileup” (Friedman, 2010).

In that arresting metaphor, some of the cars are carrying the elements of the dark side of globalisation that have been described in this book. Can the governments and international organisations of the world create effective traffic codes, regulations and systems to ensure a continually smooth flow of traffic on the global superhighway? If so, can global civil society assist the international traffic police both to keep the regular traffic flowing and to apprehend the rogue drivers and cars? Terrorism is a subset of the dark forces threatening to overwhelm the positive force of globalisation. Fortunately, in recent times Africa and Latin America
have largely, albeit not totally (we must recall the 9/11 had trial runs in East Africa) managed to escape this particular pathology of globalisation. They have many other problems, from gun running and drug trafficking (including the use of lethal force by armed criminals), to mass atrocities including ethnic cleansing, rape as an instrument of warfare, large-scale killings and even genocide.

There have been some instances of terrorist incidents in Africa, or some African links to terrorist incidents elsewhere. The major theatres of terrorism, however, have connected North America, Europe, the Middle East, Southern Asia and Southeast Asia. And the phenomenon of terrorism in turn is organically linked to other pathologies of the dark side of globalisation like illegal trafficking in arms, drugs, money and training.

**Mumbai’s 26/11 as India’s 9/11**

One can differ about the precise parallels between New York City’s 9/11 and Mumbai’s 11/26, two milestone events in the post-Cold War era (Roy, 2009). Still, there is little doubt that in the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, the tools of the digital age so effectively deployed on 9/11 were put to use in an even more sophisticated, if not quite as deadly, manner. If the signature feature of 9/11 was the use of the intended target’s own “weapons” against one of the ultimate symbols of Western capitalism, in Mumbai it was the extraordinary combination of low – and high-tech warfare against “one of the most iconic sites of metropolitan modernity in South Asia” (Kaplan, 2009).

How did they do it and why did Mumbai come to epitomise “the city as target”? (Bishop and Roy, 2009).

Much as 9/11 took several years of meticulous planning, so did Mumbai. But the basic concept behind it, as in all successful ventures, was simple. An initial cadre of 32 suicide terrorist recruits was trained in Pakistan to make bombs, survive interrogation and fight to the death (Sengupta, 2009). After training, the group was pruned to ten young men in sneakers, jeans and designer t-shirts who set sail from Karachi on November 22 using GPS coordinates. On November 23, they took over an Indian fishing trawler, all of whose crew were eventually killed, and sailed across to Mumbai, arriving on its outskirts at about 4 pm on November 26. Taking instructions from handlers in Pakistan, the ten terrorists came ashore in a motorised dinghy at about 8:30 pm and attacked five targets in two-man teams: Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (a major railway station), the Leopold Café, the Chabad House Jewish centre, and the Taj and Trident-Oberoi.
luxury hotels. Time bombs were left in the taxis they used, later killing hapless drivers and unsuspecting passengers. Over the next sixty hours, one terrorist was captured and nine killed, but only after their killing spree had left 166 dead, including several foreigners and many Muslims, several high-ranking police officers, and the city’s top anti-terrorist cop. All this was done against a nation-state with the world’s third largest army, nuclear weapons and a defence budget of $25 billion.

The organisation which trained the ten terrorists for the Mumbai operations was the banned Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). The New York Times, quoting US intelligence and counter-terrorism officials, reported that Pakistan’s Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had shared intelligence with and provided protection to the LeT (Schmitt, Mazzetti and Perlez, 2008). Based in Pakistan, the LeT has evolved from a Kashmir-focused to a globally oriented terrorist organisation. The radical Sunni-Deobandhi groups are “simultaneously fighting internal sectarian jihads” that pose a threat “to the Pakistani citizen and state,” and “regional jihads in Afghanistan and India and a global jihad against the West” (International Crisis Group, 2009). As this was the first major terrorist attack in India that received saturation coverage by the world’s leading media, for the first time it brought home to a global audience that India is a frontline state against international terrorism. Although the death of fewer than 200 cannot compare to around 3,000 killed, the impact of the real-time saturation coverage on public and political opinion was such that “26/11” marks a watershed as India’s own “9/11.” Even General David Petraeus, Commander CENTCOM, has noted that the Mumbai attacks “was a 9/11 moment for” India (The Hindu, 2009).

The slow response of Indian security was one reason the LeT group was so effective. But the main one was technology. Armed with GPS, Google maps, Blackberries and AK-47s, they were confronted by policemen with fifties-vintage recoil rifles. Ironically, one could speak of a “digital-divide” between this group of young men of peasant stock from the hills of the Pakistani countryside, on the one hand, and the metropolitan police and armed forces of one of the world’s emerging powers, known precisely for its IT and telecom prowess, on the other.

This was also “Twitter-age terrorism.” Throughout the attack, the operatives were in communication with their handlers in Karachi via their mobile smart-phones, keeping them abreast of developments, receiving instructions and being briefed on the deployment of the security forces.

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1 The two acronyms reflect the respective dating conventions: 26 November 2008 in India, September 11, 2001 in the US.
around them, conveniently provided to the rest of the world by India’s ubiquitous 24/7 TV channels. In turn, some of the best coverage of the Mumbai events those days was provided by new media and citizen-journalists, through twitter and personal blogs.

Mumbai’s proving to be India’s soft underbelly against such a deadly attack is paradoxical. Mumbai, attributed as India’s “maximum city,” has the dubious distinction of being the most attacked urban centre in the world, which is one reason observers take issue with the term “India’s 9/11.” On 12 March 1993, in which 15 almost simultaneous bomb explosions killed 257 people and left more than a 1,000 injured; in August 2003, 46 people were killed in two bomb explosions in public places; in July 2006, several bombs exploded in suburban trains there, killing some 200 and injuring 700. If there is one Indian city that should have been prepared for another such attack, it was Mumbai. The reason it wasn’t is because the November 2008 attacks upped the ante, shifting gears to a different type of terrorist operation. Instead of anonymous bombs left behind in trains or in public squares, this was about hostage-taking, machine-gun spraying and hand grenade throwing.

Mumbai has not been the only Indian city targeted by jihadis. So have New Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad and Jaipur, among others. In fact, between January 2004 and July 2007, India had 3,900 fatal victims as a result of terrorism, more than any other country anywhere with the exception of Iraq, and more than Afghanistan and Pakistan. But Mumbai, the country’s commercial and industrial capital, the one that symbolises the achievements of the new India, the city of Bollywood and of the Birlas, of the Ambanis and the Tatas, has been the favourite objective. As Suketu Mehta (2008) has put it, “just as cinema is a mass dream of the audience, Mumbai is a mass dream of the peoples of South Asia,” and thus an ideal backdrop for mass terror on the world stage.

The Mumbai attacks not only reflected the deadly use to which digital technology can be put to use by even small terrorist outfits – and why the age of globalisation is also the age of terror – but also the key role of the media in reflecting, amplifying and multiplying on many platforms the activities of these terrorist groups, which is precisely what they crave. Mumbai broke new ground, with extraordinary scenes of reporters from TV channels interrupting firemen as they attempted to save lives from the charred remains of the Taj Mahal Hotel, of television news informing their audience (and thus the terrorists) about the latest deployment of the security forces, and of television channels taking calls from the terrorists themselves as the situation unfolded, calls in which they conveyed their well-crafted messages on Kashmir and other topics to anyone who would listen.
Blowback and Network

Far from abating (a global war was declared against them formally after 9/11), terrorist actions have increased in the early 21st century. While some may argue that Al Qaeda has been weakened, this is not the case for other outfits, like LeT or the Pakistani Taliban, which may or may not be associated with Al Qaeda, but whose agenda overlaps with the latter’s. The main terror theatre has thus shifted from Afghanistan in 2001 to Iraq in 2003, back to Afghanistan in 2007–08, and then to Pakistan, a nuclear weapons state, with all the attendant risks.

This fits in well, as William Coleman argues, with the concept of “blowback,” popularised by Chalmers Johnson, and which posits a ricochet effect, as US foreign policy actions in one place rebound and have unintended consequences elsewhere, thousands of miles away. As Coleman (2011) puts it,

“When the US has utilised its power and operated as an empire, it has accelerated the speed of globalisation. In addition to networked society... globalisation has indirectly produced new forms of violence and networks of uncivil society as a way to combat US imperialism and the very forces of globalisation, especially as the divide between rich and poor grows.”

Rather than being located in a fixed abode, with set territorial boundaries and objectives determined by governments, modern jihad thus operates as a decentralised, de-territorialised network, the ultimate “non-state actors” (as Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari referred to LeT in his efforts to distance the Pakistani state from the Mumbai attacks). Traditional conceptions on how to fight such an enemy are thus bound to fail, or, even worse, generate unintended consequences that may empower him further. The Obama administration’s efforts to shift the Pentagon’s focus on the war on terror from Iraq to Afghanistan went hand in hand with a radicalisation of Pakistani Islamic fundamentalists and the rise of the Pakistani Taliban, thus raising the stakes on the future of South-Central Asia.

In fact, the network society brought about by the Third Industrial Revolution puts into question the very notion that the best way to fight Al Qaeda is to do so “in its home-base,” i.e. Afghanistan. While some of its top leaders may be in Tora Bora or in caves on the Afghanistan-Pakistani border, its cells and affiliates are spread out in many places throughout

2 The abbreviation of the region into the semi-derogatory and dismissive “Afpak” is deeply insulting and offensive to many in the region.
the broader Middle East and Northern Africa, liaising through a variety of means, including Islamic websites.

Al Qaeda, the Taliban in its various incarnations, and entities like the Naxalite movement in India, do not only deploy the digital technology that is the driving force of globalisation. They also thrive because the latter, by bringing in some into the privileged circles of contemporary consumer society, also excludes others, creating an ever wider gap of inequality, of which the wave of farmer suicides in India is one tragic result. As Ajay Mehra (2011) writes:

“It should not be surprising that precisely at the moment of “the Global Indian Takeover” (as the Indian press likes to put it), vast swathes of Central India are controlled by Maoist guerrillas, who have become both more aggressive and more successful in their operations against the Indian military.”

In fact, both phenomena are the two sides of the same coin, the bright and the dark side of globalisation.

LOCAL AND GLOBAL

The global-local interface has relevance even for geopolitics, as M.J. Akbar (2011) makes clear. He notes that by definition, a superpower has a global presence and power while challenges to it tend to be regional and are therefore met with by a regional application of globally derived assets and power. But a distinctive shift in the 21st century, he notes, is the manner in which the challengers to the superpower too have fashioned a globalised network of assets and personnel. He highlights examples of the interconnectedness of three regional theatres, in which bilateral US relations with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan evolve and intermingle simultaneously with the overlay of the regional dynamics. The net, decidedly unintended, result has been the weakening of US power and authority both regionally and globally and “the unlikely strengthening of Iran as a regional power.” Having achieved recognition as a regional power, Iran is engaged in an intricate diplomatic game “to achieve tacit recognition of its nuclear programme as the counterpoint to Israel, much in the way that the United States accepted Pakistan’s right to respond to India’s nuclear-weapons capability.”

The interaction between global crosscurrents and local actors is evident in the string of insurgencies and terrorist movements across South Asia. The Indian subcontinent is one of the places where the sunny and dark sides of globalisation clash with particular force, while also highlighting the
dialectic between the local and the global that is such a feature of our era. Pakistan’s record of double dealing, deceit and denial of Pakistan-based attacks, in Afghanistan and India alike, has been based on four degrees of separation – between the government, army, the ISI, and terrorists – whose plausibility may be fading as it is exploited as a convenient alibi to escape accountability.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, by instinct circumspect in his words, believes that, “given the sophistication and military precision,” the Mumbai attacks “must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan” (Doordarshan News, 2009). The combination of training, selection and advance reconnaissance of targets, diversionary tactics, discipline, munitions, cryptographic communications, false IDs, and damage inflicted is more typically associated with Special Forces units than terrorists (David Kilcullen, an Australian counter-insurgency expert who has worked with US forces, quoted in Zakaria, 2008). After Mumbai’s three-stage amphibious operation, even US agencies concluded that the LeT is a more capable and greater threat than previously believed (Schmitt, Mazzetti and Perlez, 2008). The plot was hatched and launched in Pakistan and while the operation was underway in Mumbai, “it was masterminded and controlled from Pakistan,” according to Home Minister P. Chidambaram (Singh, 2009). Senior LeT operatives Zarar Shah and Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi, indicted by the Indian police for acting as Pakistan-based handlers for the Mumbai attacks, are known to be close associates of the ISI (Parthasarathy, 2009).

While the US viewed Pakistan as an ally against international enemies, the alliance was useful to Islamabad principally in an India-specific context. The two imperatives intersected with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Saudi financing and American arms and training built up the mujahedeen as a potent force to bleed the Soviets in Afghanistan. Over time, this built up a battle-hardened jihadist army, including one Osama bin Laden, which exported terror from Afghanistan to make common cause with Islamist struggles all over the world. Yesterday’s anti-Soviet mujahedeen in Afghanistan is today’s anti-Western jihadist everywhere.

The Saudi connection led to a spurt of madrassas spewing hatred against Jews, Christians and Hindus with equal venom. The army harnessed Islamism both against civilian political parties at home, to maintain control over Afghanistan, and against India. In power for nine years as a president (1999–2008), controlling both the country and the military, General Pervez Musharraf failed to deliver Pakistan from the scourge of terrorism, in part because success against the jihadists would end his utility to the West. Musharraf cut deals with extremists in the northwest regions of Pakistan, from where the re-grouped Taliban and al Qaeda launched
increasingly deadly assaults into Afghanistan. The nightmare scenario of nuclear weapons coming under the control of Islamists has come ever closer to reality (Sanger, 2009).^3^ Abdul Qadeer Khan established a global nuclear bazaar that did lucrative business with Iran, Libya and North Korea (Clary, 2004; Frantz and Collins, 2007). The government was complicit in, connived in and facilitated, or at the very least knew about and tolerated the existence and activities of the network. When caught out, the “hero of the nation” was placed under a comfortable version of house arrest by his “friend” Musharraf. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Americans have not been permitted to interrogate Khan. Arguably, the Khan network is still active and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not safe (Armstrong and Trento, 2007; Harrison, 2008; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007; Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007).

Had Musharraf eliminated the threat of Islamists, his utility to Washington and the fear of the alternative would have disappeared. If he failed to show any tangible progress, he would have been toppled, he therefore played both ends against the middle brilliantly. But that meant that the policy contradictions ripened and threatened to burst. The Islamists survived, re-grouped, built up their base and launched more frequent raids across the border in Afghanistan but also deep into the heart of Pakistan itself. Slowly but surely, Pakistan descended into the failed state syndrome (Rashid, 2008). Almost every incident of international terrorism, including 9/11, has had some significant link to Pakistan. One recent episode was the failed attempt to set off a car bomb in Times Square in New York on May 1, 2010. The chief suspect in that is Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-American believed to have received bomb-making training over several months at a terrorist camp run by militants in Waziristan in northern Pakistan (Rashid 2010).

If Al Qaeda is driven largely by religious reasons and the Naxalites by socio-economic ones, the LTTE in Sri Lanka was so by ethno-nationalism and the discrimination and aggravation exercised against the Tamil minority by the Sinhala majority. One reason the Tamil Tigers managed to wage what amounted to a civil war for a quarter of a century against the Sri Lankan state, a remarkable feat on a self-contained island state whose topography does not lend itself to guerrilla warfare, was their technological prowess. As S.D. Muni (2011) points out,

^3^ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged that the “unthinkable” could happen in Pakistan: the Taliban and al Qaeda could topple the government, giving them “the keys to the nuclear arsenal”; “Taliban finger on Pak N-switch has US worried,” Times of India, April 27, 2009. A suicide attack on a bus in Rawalpindi on July 2, 2009 was the first to single out workers of Pakistan’s nuclear labs (Masood, 2009).
They deployed their own shipping fleet, thus ensuring steady supply lines. They built their own Navy and Air Force, including mini-submarines and light aircraft assembled from pre-ordered kits, from which they bombed Colombo, taking the war to the very heart of the Sri Lankan capital. In the annals of terrorism, they are also credited with the dubious distinction as having invented the suicide-bomber vest, by now widely used throughout the greater Middle East and elsewhere, as well as with having pioneered the use of female suicide bombers, and widely deployed child soldiers.”

They also made the most of information technology. Their vast databases of the Tamil diaspora, especially in Western Europe and North America, allowed them to tap into the resources of the Tamil community abroad and ensure a steady income to finance their operations. In an interdependent world, the LTTE was also aware of the need to keep Western public opinion on its side, and played with great effect on the identity politics prevalent in advanced democracies. Their supreme leader, Velupillai Prabakaran, in his final stance on a small sliver of land behind a lagoon in Sri Lanka’s Northern tip, Wanni region, died with a side arm in one hand and a satellite phone in the other, hoping to the last minute that the international community would come to his rescue (Heine, 2009).

Yet, if their global network both empowered the LTTE insurgency and ultimately doomed them, the secret to the Nepalese Maoists’ success, such as it was, to have realised that, however ideological their struggle and internationalist their outlook, Nepal is ultimately dependent on India. They became aware that, with the murder of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the LTTE had burned their bridges with India and would never be able to establish their desired independent Tamil state in northern Sri Lanka, as that would be unacceptable to Sri Lanka’s northern neighbour.

The Nepalese Maoists, under the leadership of Prachanda, needed to establish their strictly local roots and ambitions. The initial association with the Indian Naxalites, their ideological brethren, was thus cut off. Much the same can be said about any illusions of having Beijing as the Nepalese Maoists’ patron, something that also would have been unacceptable to New Delhi. Anchored deep in the mountain kingdom’s countryside, they thus waged a long war against the Nepalese state and the Nepalese monarchy, in which they succeeded, precisely because they managed to portray themselves as a local movement embodying the last best hope to get rid of an absolute monarch, King Gyanendra, seen as corrupt, incompetent and ineffectual. They also jettisoned their revolutionary socialist program and embraced representative democracy. This geopolitical and ideological pragmatism served them well.
As the contrasting cases of the Sri Lankan LTTE and the Nepalese Maoists show, in the age of globalisation, the key to the outcomes of socio-political processes lies in the interface between the local and the global. The global context can be a ready source of material and ideational resources to be deployed locally to great effect. Yet, and this is especially true for small, developing nations in the Global South, a single misreading of that international environment and a consequent misstep (such as the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by an LTTE female bomber armed with one of those fabled suicide vests – itself an example of deadly blowback in that India had previously tolerated, if not permitted and supported, LTTE cells being based in India) can have devastating consequences. With a large Tamil population and an overwhelming Hindu majority, India was the one country that could have provided help and succour to the Sri Lankan Tamil struggle for autonomy and/or independence. After Rajiv Gandhi’s death in Sriperumbudur, that was not going to happen.

A similar dialectic is at play in Kashmir. The India – Pakistan border has been described as the most dangerous in the world, as it joins two nuclear powers which have waged war against each other thrice in sixty years. At the heart of the India – Pakistan dispute is the fate of Kashmir, with its Muslim majority, yet part of India. On the face of it, Kashmir can seem to be to South Asia what Palestine is to the Middle East: a rallying cause for all Muslims in the region, ready to champion the cause of Kashmiri independence. Yet, appearances can be deceiving. Unpacking the Kashmiri predicament is a complex endeavour. It is not evident that a majority of Kashmiris do not prefer independence from India, nor that they wish to become part of Pakistan, in many ways a failed state where the government has little control over what happens in much of its territory and where terrorism is rampant.

**Terrorists or Militants?**

Rekha Chowdhary (2011), on the other hand, questions the very use of the term “terrorism”. She argues this is done in an a historical fashion; having become “a geo-strategic term used to justify intervention in the internal affairs of countries” (Chowdhury 2011), while also obviating the relationship between terrorism and resistance. In her discussion of the latter in Jammu and Kashmir, she contests the notion of terrorism as an “original evil,” choosing to use instead the term “armed militancy.” The latter term reflects the politics of language – the Indian media as a rule don’t refer to the “armed propaganda actions” in Kashmir as being undertaken by terrorists – they use the word “militants.” When pressed about it, Indian
journalists will readily confess that they do so under some duress—if they don’t, they might lose access to sources in the “movement,” or worse.

As Chowdhary (2011) puts it, taking us back to the complex interaction between the global and the local, “militancy in Kashmir has, at present, both an indigenous as well as a foreign face.” The various groups that took up the armed struggle in the Valley form a veritable smorgasbord of the political options on the table, from the JKLF (advocating independence), to the Hizb (favoring integration with Pakistan), on the local side; on the global, Islamic Jihad side, there is Lashkar-e-Toiba (lately of Mumbai fame), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad, groups led and formed by Afghans, Arabs and Pakistanis. And it is here again that we see the “blowback,” ricochet effect alluded to earlier, such a prominent feature of international conflict in the age of globalisation. It is not a coincidence that political violence in J&K shot up in 1989, precisely when many of these foreign jihadists came to Kashmir, after the withdrawal and defeat of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Trained and armed by the CIA and the ISI (the Pakistani intelligence services), and finding themselves unemployed, they were ready to take on a new cause. This was to help Kashmiri militants, but also to stir the embers of the anti-India sentiment in the Valley and in Jammu, while undertaking armed actions in the rest of India – as in the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and in the one on Mumbai in 2008.

Yet “blowback” works in unexpected ways. While originally welcomed to the Valley as valued help to “the boys,” the “Afghan Arabs” and Pakistanis outstayed their welcome. Their disregard for local customs and their Pan-Islamism soon alienated Kashmiris, in the process delegitimising much of the basis of the local uprising, which is based on the defence of Kashmiri identity – i.e., the local. Muslim Kashmir has come full circle. From the affirmation of its traditions vis-à-vis Hindu India, it is now reacting to the threat to its customs posed by Wahabi Islam.

**Why has Jihad taken a new lease on life in the age of globalisation?**

The new impetus with which jihad is waged in the early 21st century poses a paradox. Why is it that, precisely at a time of enormous material progress made possible by the technological advances of the Third Industrial Revolution, do we also find the rise of movements seemingly bent on turning the clock backwards? Why is it that such medieval notions as the non-education of women and the cutting of limbs for what some would consider minor infractions of the law are enjoying resurgence in what is sometimes described as the Age of Information?
One answer to that question was given by Samuel P. Huntington in *The Clash of Civilisations*, a book whose controversial and provocative thesis has given rise to an enormous literature. Neither time nor space allows us to do full justice to either. More modestly, we would like to posit at least two reasons as to why this is the case.

1) **The dynamics of globalisation is about inclusion, but also about exclusion**

As we pointed out in the Introduction, globalisation has brought much progress to many people around the world, raising their standard of living in ways that would have been unthinkable only a few decades ago. Anyone who compares the state of cities like Shanghai and Mumbai in the seventies with their current condition can attest to that. At the same time, the network society on which globalisation is based and thrives on is all about tossing out and segregating those who are not part of the network, on the reasoning they have little or nothing to contribute to the latter. Inevitably, the excluded, many of whom can be found in parts of Africa and Asia where the Muslim religion prevails, are aggrieved, feeling they have little to lose by joining *jihad*. Yet, *pace* Huntington, the causal link between political violence and the Muslim religion is by no means unidirectional or over determined. The 150 million Indian Muslims, among whom the jihadi cause has found few takers, is the best counter factual example of the dangers of oversimplification in this highly dangerous terrain of social science analysis.

2) **Modern jihad lends itself especially to the best and worst of globalisation**

As Nasra Hassan observes, after many years of interviewing jihadis, the apparent contradiction between the modern trappings of the digital age and the seeming backwardness of those bent on imposing Sharia law on an ever larger number of societies, preferably by force, is misleading. In fact, they complement each other rather nicely (Hassan, 2011). To start with “Muslim culture has been historically based on global networks” (Castells, 2009). And, as one of Hassan’s interviewees put it,

> “Actually, Islam introduced globalisation fourteen centuries ago. Our religion exploded beyond the Arabian Peninsula, into other continents. It demolished borders and ‘national’ rule, it did away with inequality and exploitation.”
There are, in fact, striking parallels between the globalisation process as envisioned by its most ardent advocates, in which markets, businesses and the laws of international supply and demand leave behind the Westphalian system based on ever more obsolete nation states, and that of jihad and political Islam. The latter does not recognize national borders and/or legal systems and aims for unifying the whole world under Islamist rule. In addition to a similar Weltanschauung, they also share a commitment to the tools that have compressed time and space in the early twenty first century, including the use of Internet and the World Wide Web. In addition to the madrassas, Islamist websites have become a key recruiting tool for jihadists.

CONCLUSION

We live in a world in which affairs across borders are conducted largely in an orderly, stable and predictable manner because of the reality of global governance even without world government. At the same time, there are periodic bouts of market volatility, financial crises, humanitarian emergencies, armed conflicts and even interstate wars as “pockets of apparent disorder” (Kuhn, 1970: 42) amidst the generally prevailing orderly conduct of international business. It has been claimed elsewhere that part of the explanation for the stability-disorder gap lies in the existence of several disconnects (Weiss and Thakur, 2010). First, while the source and scale of most of today’s pressing challenges are global, and any effective solution to them must also be global, the policy authority for tackling those remains vested in states.

Second, the coercive capacity to mobilise the resources necessary to tackle global problems also remains vested in states, thereby effectively incapacitating many international institutions. Third, there is a critical time lag between the emergence of collective action problems with trans-border, especially global, dimensions, on the one hand and the evolution of intergovernmental organisations to facilitate robust international responses to them, on the other. Finally, and most pertinently for present purposes, there is a disconnect between the numbers and types of actors playing ever-expanding roles in civil, political, and economic affairs within and among nations, and the concentration of decision-making authority in intergovernmental institutions.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) such as, International Crisis Group, Oxfam, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, *Medecins Sans Frontiers*, Save the Children, World Vision, Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, to name a few can often be found on the ground in unstable areas far beyond the coverage of television cameras.
information that they gather and disseminate is indispensable to generating the international will to prevent, manage and terminate conflicts. CSOs play complementary roles to intergovernmental efforts to mute the conflicts and mitigate their worst humanitarian consequences. On small arms and light weapons, the International Action Network on Small Arms, International Alert, the International Peace Bureau, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Institute for Security Studies, the Small Arms Survey and others conduct extensive research to provide state-of-the-art information and analysis. Many of them have also mounted lobbying campaigns in Nepal, Central Asia, Central America and West Africa and elsewhere. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom has focussed on the prevention of the weaponisation of space, on ending the recruitment of child soldiers, and on the reintegration of ex-combatants.

Working with business and governments in the Kimberly Process, CSOs have tried to delegitimise conflict diamonds which often have funded the dark side of globalisation. Cross-border terrorism, as well as people, drugs and arms trafficking and money laundering, present major challenges to all governments, particularly the poorer ones. Civil society groups have tried to redress the balance between security and civil liberties. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Committee of the Red Cross have worked tirelessly to publicize flaws in due process and physical abuses in detention centres. Human Rights Watch has also charged the UN Security Council with dereliction of duty as governments used the war on terror to crack down on human rights.

Because civil society is outside the formal channels of governmental and inter-governmental decision-making, its roles embrace sectors of social activity other than making and implementing public policy decisions. They attempt to influence the norms and shape the conduct of all actors engaged in the exercise of international public power through research, outreach, advocacy, lobbying, monitoring and humanitarian activities. That is, the need is greater than ever for civil society to shine the searchlight of critical scrutiny on the dark side of globalisation precisely in order to ensure that the good that globalisation does triumphs and its deleterious effects are mitigated.
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